Politika, Politológia | Biztonság- és külpolitika » Igor Torbakov - This is a Strife of Slavs among Themselves, Understanding Russian Ukrainian Relations as the Conflict of Contested Identities

Igor Torbakov "This Is a Strife of Slavs among Themselves": Understanding Russian-Ukrainian Relations as the Conflict of Contested Identities As Alexander Pushkin, Russiás greatest poet, was nervously following the news from Poland where the Russian troops laid siege to Warsaw during the 1831 Polish Uprising, he was never in doubt as to what was at stake in this bitter Russo-Polish conflict: Will the Slavonic streams converge in tb.e Russian se a? Will it dry up? That is the question. VThile he conceded the existence of a distinct Polish national identity, Pushkin was firmly convinced that an independent Polish state was inimical to Russias interests. Moreover, he passionately argued in his patriotic ode "To the Slanderers of Russia; addressing political leaders of the non-Slavíc West, the old Russo-Polish rivalry, basically a domestic Slavíc affair, had already been resolved in Russias favor and in any case it was none ofEuropes business. 1his is a strife of Slavs

among themselves, An old domestic strife, already weighed by fate, An issue not to be resolved by you. Leave us alone . To you is unintelligible, to you is alien This family feud. 1 • Pushkins emotional and defiant poem is quite remarkáble in that it contains all the basic features that would become characteristic of Russias stance vis-Cl-vis its Slavic borderlands and the nations of the "core Europe" for many decades to come. These main features are as follows: Russia should assert itself as the leader of the Slavs, firmly securing all the "Slavíc rivers" flowing into the "Russian seá; Russiás Slavíc possessions (which in Pushkins time and up to the end ofWorld War I also included Polish territories) are strategically extremely important as they substantiate Russias claim to the status of a great power in full control of Eastern Europe and at the same time undercut Western European claims to IIymKMH A.C, IIoltrwe co6pa1-me cottuHettuU, T 3 Bhml

MocKBa, 1948, Translation is mine. p. 269 184 Igor Torbakov Poland and to other Slavic lands as part ofWestern civilization; whatever Russia does, the West will invariably retain its unfriendly posture as it is intrinsically Russophobic ("You simply hate us; Pushkin exclaims at one point); the West is oblivious of the complexities of Slavic history, and its prejudices and mispercep· tions born of ignorance should be countered by Russias own historical narrative; Russia:s relations with its Slavic neighbors is a "family business" which the West has nothing to do with. As Harsha Ram perceptively notes, Pushkins 1831 poem appears to "signal a new kind of politics" - the one thai seeks to "proclaim the existence of a common Slavic world and to signal a profound cultural fissure between Russia and Western Europe: 2 Now fast forward to 2014. Contemporary Poland is of course a sovereign state comfortably ensconced within the "core Europe" as a

full member ofEuroAtlantic institutions - the European Union and NATO. This time round, however, another political upheaval has shaken the "Slavic world" - the one thai came to be known as Ukraines "February Revolution." Russias reaction to the turrnoil in Kyiv that culminated in the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych and the demise of his kleptocratic regime was nervous, angry and aggressive. Remarkably, some analysts immediately drew parallels between the old Poland and the present-day Ukraine. "Ukraine is a Poland of the 2P century; argues Vladimir Pastukhov, a visiting fellow at St. Antonys College, Oxford, and frequent contributor to Russian liberal media outlets "Its only that the buffer zone between Russia and the West has shifted eastward." 3 To be sure, in terms of the density of historical, religious, political and economic ties, Ukraine is much closer to Russia than Poland has ever been. "Beyond Ukraines strategic µIId economic

value; notes Edyta Bojanowska, Professor of Russian Literature at Rt;itgers University, "the cultural factors thai have played a role ü1 inaking Ukraine central to Russias geopolitical self-image continue to inform Popular attitudes:4 Thus there is an overwhelming sense in Moscow that the developments triggered by 3 Ram H., The Imperial Sublime: A Russian Poetics aj Empire Madison, WI: University ofWisconsin Press, 2003, p. 214 Emphasis added See also: Hokanson K, The 11ntiPolish Poems and I built myself a monument not made by human hands, in: Gillespie A.D (ed), Taboo Pushkin: Topics, Texts, Interpretations, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012, p. 283-320 IIacTyxoB B., YKpaw-ia - 3mo Ilonbwa XXI BeKa, Politru, 14/4/2014, http://politru/ 4 article/2014/04114/ukraine/. Bojanowska E., All the Kings Horses: Ukraine, Russia, and Gogols Troika, Jordan 2 Russia Center,· ·22/4/2014, http://jordanrussiacenter.org/ news/kings-horses-ukrainerussian-gogols-troika/#

U2Qf1FV s9g Understanding Russian-Ukrainian Relations 185 the Ukrainian Maidan have challenged Russias national interest in an absolutely unprecedented manner. Anyone with some grasp of Russian and East European history who watched the broadcast of Vladimir Putins triumphant "Crimea speech cannot fail to be struck by how the tropes first introduced by Pushkin powerfully reverberated in the Russian presidents address. 5 Ahnost two hundred years on, Putins manifesto is as defiant towards the "West" and as protective of the "Slavic world" - this time, the "East Slavic Orthodox civilization to which Russia, Belarus and Ukraine belong - as Pushkins "To the Slanderers of Russia: Westerners might wonder at such amazing continuity but Eastem Europeans will not: the people residing in these lands do have very long memories. The bottom line here is this Ali the crucial issues that Russia and Ukraine wrangle over ultimately relate to how the long centuries

of history thai they shared as well as their diífering historical experiences have been interpreted in the two countries. It is mutual (mis)perceptions, conflicting historical myths and contested identities that lie at the heart of the uneasy Russia-Ukraine relationship. Moreover, it is precisely the identity conilict thai shapes the way the relationship has been evolving - both before and especially after the fateful 1991 divide thai marked the end of the Soviet Union. The main objective of this essay then is to investigate how the identity issue is connected to Russias and Ukraines international conduct. Basically I intend to look into how contested identities affect bilateral relations. Two interconnected questions will be explored: 1) in what way did the pre-1991 Russian-Ukrainian interaction prepare the ground for the clash of identities? and 2) which practices employed by both sides during the post-independence period helped reinforce the conflict potential, putting the two

Slavic neighbors on a collision course? ln my understanding, however, the notion of identity isi,not reduced to ethnicity and/or language or to the ways the past is remembered·and represented but also includes an axiological dimension - that is the value system that social groups or a society at large uphold. My argument is thai, ultimately, it is precisely in the reahn of axiology, not ethnicity, that the identity conflict between Ukraine and Russia is currently taking place. Notably, the Ukrainian Maidan of 2013-14 has consciously styled itself as the EuroMaidan - the narne thai explicitly emphasized the revolutionaries geopolitical and, more important, "civilizational" choice. EuroMaidan activists have called their protest a "revolution of dignity" or a "revolution of values: lhile a significant number of Ukrainians have opted 5 IlyTHH B.B, O6ftaw,er1ue Ilpe3uiJmma PoccuücKoÜ <l>e0epau,uu, Kremlinru, March 18, 2014,

http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/20603 186 Igor Torbakov for "Europe" understood as a specific values-based system, Moscows more conservative ideologues seem prepared to start their own "identity revolution and prodaim that "Russia is not Europe: 6 So far, the chances of reconciling these two opposite positions look rather slim. I Over tb.e past several decades, the most significant contribution to our understanding of international politics was made by scholars who focused their research on the issues of sovereignty and identity. ln a Westphalian system (and our conternporary international system in its essence largely remains Westphalian), whose basic unit is a sovereign state, sovereignty is an absolutely crucial notion. ln many parts of the world, however, sovereignty has becorne unquestioned: it is no longer contested and thus has ceased to be a big issue for analysts Yet, there are some regions - such as, for example, post-Soviet Eurasia - where

sovereignty is fiercely contested. There the issues of sovereignty and identity are the key drivers of regional politics. This is not to say, as Paul DAnieri cogently notes, that "national identity issues . make material interests irrelevant: Rather, "they crucially influence the interpretation of those issues." DAnieri further explains: "The argument that emerges from this approach connects historyto contested national identities, contested national identities to disputes over state sovereignty, and disputes over sovereignty to conflict on the material issues: 7 A close look at the Russia-Ukraine relationship through this analytic prism will lead one to a conclusion that the relationship is deeply conflictual. At first blush, however, this assertion might seem counterintuitive: many a comn:íeri.tator (especially an outside observer) would wonder wliat exactly the problem is between people so ethnically, linguistically, and culturally similar. Yet the late Moscow

historian and political thinker Dmitry Furman, noting that relations between nations and states are in no way more complex than relations inside a family or between neighbors, argued that the relationship between brothers is 6 7 The draft document entitled "The Foundations of State Cultural Policy" and elaborated by the Russian Ministry of Cultures officials contains this very thesis, namely that "Russia is notEurope" but constitutes a distinct "civilization in its own right. See: Py6u;oB A., IlomepHHHaH U,UBUT!U3aU,UJl, Be,u;oMOCTH, 14/4/2014, wwwvedomostiru/ newsline/ news/ 2 5282221 / poteryannaya-civilizaciya. DAnieri P., Natioríalism and International Politics: Identity and Sovereignty in the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict, "Nationalism andEthnic Politics: Vol. 3 No 2 1997, p 2 Understanding Russian-Ukrainian Relations 187 not always easy or without conflict. After all, Serbs and Croats are brothers, too "What is it; he asked, "that

divides Ukrainian and Russian brothers as soon as they recall that they constitute separate peoples?" ln his opinion, "It is the same stuff thai normally divides brothers - the struggle over parents, primogeniture, legacy. The wrangling over the necessity for the elder brother to recognize the younger one as an equal and drop the bad habit of obtrusive trusteeship over him, and, conversely, over the necessity for the younger brother not to forget his junior place in the farnily hierarchy and behave accordingIY: Ironically, this very closeness and affinity lie at the heart ofUkrainian-Russian problems. As soon as Ukraine gained independence following the Soviet Unions disintegration, its ultimate goal was to assert its distinct national identity and sovereignty which means, in practical terms, to attain recognition of its separateness from Russia. This, however, has been continuously denied by Moscow Arguably, until now the majority of Russians and some segments of Ukraines

population (which indudes 11 million ethnic Russians) have not seen the difference between the two Slavic peoples and, consequently, have not understood the raison detre of a separate Ukrainian state. President Putin repeatedly referred to Ukraine as a "complex state formation" (the implication being that it is not a full-blown sovereign state). 9 He also argued that "Russians and Ukrainians are one people; ominously adding recently thai the Russians are "the largest divided people in the world: 10 Ukraines policy elites would beg to disagree. The causes of these conflicting attitudes are rooted in Russias and Ukraines entangled histories. 11 When the fledgling states of Russia and Ukraine < erged from under the rubble of the Soviet Unions unraveling some analysts tended to regard them as new polities with no previous experience of international relations between them. The argument was that these two incipient states thai arnicably agreed 8 <DypMaH )];.E,

PyccKUe u yKpaUHU,bl: mpyÖHble omHouteHUH 6pambe8, in: cf>ypMaH LJ;.E (ed) YKpauHa u PoccuH: o6w,ecmaa u zocyOapcmaa, MocKBa: J1sp; «ITpaBa IeJI0BeKa», 1997, p. 4, s 9 Putin V.V, Text of PuHns Speech at NATO Summit (Bucharest, 2/4/2008), UNIAN, 18/4/2008, http://www.unianinfo/world/ 1110 33-text-of-putins-speech-at-nato-summit- bucharest-april-2-200&:html. 10 Ilynrn B.B, 06pawi1-1ue IIpe3uiJrnmaPoccui1cKoü <I>eOepau,uu, Kremlinru, 18/3/2008, http:/ /kremlin.ru/transcripts/20603 188 Igor Torbakov to bury tb.e "totalitarian Soviet monster" would start shaping ties and contacts from a "blank page" in a good-neighborly manner. Yet crucially; post-Soviet Russia and post-Soviet Ukraine did not suddenly emerge from thin air. Russia, both legally and in the political outlook of its elites and masses, claimed a noble pedigree. It solemnly pronounced itself a direct successor to the mighty Russian Empire and formidable Soviet Union. lts State Durnas

adoption of a national coat of arms (the Byzantine-Muscovite double-headed eagle), flag (Peter the Greats tricolor), and anthem (the Soviet-era hymn comrnissioned by Stalin with reworked post-Soviet lyrics) is nothing less than an attempt to symbolically mark that political continuum. Ukraine, although lacking such an illustrious lineage, still was a territory where a number of efforts had been rnade to form a modern nation and build a sovereign state. Ukrainian official nationalist historiography has come up with its own millennial narrative whereby the year of 1991 - Ukraines annus rnirabilis - is presented as a glorious event on the long and thorny path of the Ukrainian people toward political independence and a national state. The major signposts on tb.is path, this narrative asserts, are the Ukrainian ancient state of Kyiv Rus, the Ukrainian "Cossack State" of the 17" centmy and the Hetrnanate of the 18h centmy; as well as the Ukrainian Peoples Republic of!917-20.

According to this linear grand story, the referendum on independence in December 1991 caps the millennium-long process ofUkrainian state- and nation-building. However, and thats the point, in the tirnefrarne of modern history Ukraine either in its entirety or partially - was absorbed into a Russia in one of its incarnations. It could even be argued that Ukraine as a nation was "imagined" by Ukrainian nationalists but Ukraines "geobody" as we now know was forged largely by Russian imperial bureaucrats and Soviet comrnunist adrninistrators numbering, to be sure, many ethnic Ukrainians arriol}g their ranks. Thus from the historical perspective, the relations between co~temporary Ukraine and Russia cannot be anything other than the uneasy and bitter relations between farmer subject and ruler, periphery and center, and, some would contend, colony and metropole.11 One rnight argue that the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations is the all-too-typical story of nationalism

- the one that pits a nation on the rise against an empire in decline. Once there was a boundless Russian Empire 11 Far a discussion of Ukraine-Russia relations from the postcolonial perspective, see: Velychenko S., The Issue of Russian Colonialism in Ukrainian Thought: Dependency Identity andDevelopment, "Ab Irnperio: No. l 2002, p 323-367; Shkandrij M, Russia and Ukraine: Literatilre and the Discourse of Empire from Napoleon to Postcolonial Times, Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001; Szeptycki A., Ukraine as a Postcolonial State?, "Polish Quarterly oflnternational Affairs: No. 1 2011, p 5-29 Understanding Russian-Ukrainian Relations 189 populated by a host of various peoples united by the loyalty to the Romanov dynasty and the sacred person of the monarch. At a certain point, these peoples (Ukrainians included), or rather their elites, decided to have states of their own and to be ruled by their kin. Modem allegiance to ones nation clashed with the

premodern allegiance to an empire (or rather an emperor), ln the case of Russians and Ukrainians - as Roman Szporluk and Aleksei Miller have shown there began a :fierce rivalry of two national(ist) projects. 12 Starting in the second half of the 19" century, Russian political elites, as the imperial masters who were alarmed by the rising nationalist sentiment in the borderlands, tried to realize the grand project of the "larger Russian nation; wherein no distinction was recognized between Belarusians, Little Russians (Ukrainians), and Great Russians proper. 13 All three groups were viewed as mere boughs of the one mighty Russian tree. This idea, insisted St Petersburg imperial nationalist bureaucrats, should be driven home through various communication channels to every single peasant hut all across the Eastern European plains. To this Russian grand design, Ukrainian intellectual elites responded with a concept of a separate Ukrainian nation, completely distinct from the

Russians and having its own glorious past, literary language, and high culture. By the tirne of the Russian Empires demise following World War I and the 1917 Revolution, both Russians and Ukrainians were nations in the making, with their respective national projects, quite naturally, vigorously competing. This rivalry was in its essence a zero-sum conflict as the "larger Russian nation" project sought to lump the Great Russians (Velikorosy) and Little Russians (Malorosy) together in a broader notion of "russkii" and flatly denied the existence of a separate Ukrainian identity. 14 This distinct Ukrainian identity - one irnplying a radical shift ofloyalty away from empire and toward the Ukrainian nation -. Wa~ indeed very rare before 12 Szporluk R., Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000; Mmrnep A., YKpaw--1cKuÜ Bonpoc" B nonumuKe Bnacmeü u pyccKOM o6w,ecmBeHHOM MHCHUU (BmopaH nonOBUHa XIX BeKa),

IIeTep6ypr: AneTe.H, 2000. 13 Kappeler A., Great Russians and Little Russians: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Perceptions in Historical Perspective, "Donald W Treadgold Papers: Seattle: University ofWashington Press, 2003. 14 See: Hillis F., Children of Rus: Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013; Andriewsky 0., The Russian-Ukrainian Discourse and the Fci.ilure of the Little Russian Solution, 1782-1917, in: Kappeler A, Kohut Z.E, sySyn IiE; von Hagen M (eds), Culture, Nation, and Identity, Edmonton, 2003, p. 182-214 190 Igor Torbakov 1917 and was confined predorninantly to a narrow circle of local intellectuals. Even at the peak of national mobilization during the 1917 Revolution and civil war, a sense of group identity in Ukraine remained rather amorphous and fluid. ln the words of an English diplornatic report dated May 1918, "The peasants speak the Little Russian dialect; a small group of nationalist

intelligentsia now professes a Ukrainian identity distinct from that of the Great Russians. Whether such a nationality exists is usually discussed in terms in which the question can receive no answer. Were one to ask the average peasant in the Ukraine his nationality, he would answer thai he is Greek Orthodox; if pressed to say whether he is a Great Russian, a Pole, or a Ukrainian, he would probably reply thai he is a peasant; and if one insisted on knowing what language he spoke, he would say that he talked the "local tongue: One rnight perhaps get hirn to cal! hirnself by a proper national narne and say thai he is "russkii; but this declaration would hardly prejudge the question of a Ukrainian relationship; he sirnply doesnt think of nationality ín the terms familiar to the intelligentsia. Again, if one tried to find out to what State he desires to belong - whether he wanted to be ruled by an Ali-Russian or a separate Ukrainian Government - one would find that in his

opinion all Governments alike are a nuisance, and that it would be best if the "Christian peasant-folk" were left to thernselves: 15 The turmoil of the revolutionary period raised somewhat the levei of national consciousness of Ukrainian peasants. They came to distinguish between themselves and the scores of intruders from the (rnostly Russian-speaking) cities, who would talk a different tongue and sneer at the local dialect and culture. Red Arrny units (prodotriady) would ransack the Ukrainian countryside and take wheat frorn the peasants to feed their troops. "They quickly perceived Ihat the conflict between thernselves and these strangers was a struggl, to control the food they grew." 16 Out of their "petty bourgeois" indignation ancfeconomic wrath a political notion was born that "alien rule is illegitimate rule; that Ukrainians - those honest and hard-working land tillers - should be govemed by the people of their kin. Guided by this idea,

rnillions of Ukrainian peasants becarne a social base (albeit a rather volatile one) for a succession of Ukrainian quasi-independent governrnents in 1917-20. Although that first atternpt to establish a sovereign Ukrainian state eventually failed, the level of national consciousness attained by 15 Raeff M., Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 66 16 Liber G., Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; p. 6 Understanding Russian-Ukrainian Relations 191 the Ukrainianmasses compelled thevictorious Moscow Bolsheviks to seek a compromise with the regained former imperial borderland to legitimize Communist rule. This compromise was realized through the establishment öf the Socialist Ukrainian (quasi) state - Ukrainian SSR, the Communist Party of Ukraine, and an affirmative action-like cultural and linguistic policy- Ukrainizatsiya. 17 Make

no rnistake though: frorn the outset the "policy of national rebirth in Ulaaine was under Moscows overall control, with the Main Political Directorate (GPU) and the Peoples Commissariat oflnternal Affairs (NKVD) policing "excesses" in the spheres of local academia and culture. Even at its height, Ukrainianization produced mixed results. ln 1930, the Soviet Ulaainian writer Borys AntonenkoDavydovych was complaining: "One could live ones entire life in a Ukrainian city and not know Ukrainian. You could ask the conductor in a Kyiv streetcar a question in Ukrainian and he would pretend that he did not understand you. A Ukrainian writer, appearing before a provincia! audience, might discover that ninety percent of the audience had never read anyofhis works or heard anything about hirn at all. But it should be axiomatic that is best and most "natural" to learn Ukrainian in a Ukrainian city, for the most part to hear Ukrainian on Kyivs streets, and for eighty

percent of the readers to borrow Ukrainian books frorn urban libraries. 2 x 2 = 4, right? But this equation has yet to be demonstrated under our conditions in Ukraine. For us, this is still a theorern: 18 Indeed, the formation of the USSR created a new, and rather contradictory, situation - the one !hat, in terms of nationality policy, radically differed from that existing during Russias late imperial period. On the one hand, one tould assume that the Soviet federative state - which, at the moment of its emergen<::e ín 1922, was nothing other than a political concessionto.the borderland peoples should have given rnore advantages to Ukrainians in their drive to successfully cornplete their national project. Yet the Soviet Union, as is well known, was not a true federation, and any attempt to shape a separate Ukrainian political identity was simply out of the question. ln the words of one historian, "Soviet nationality policy placed Ukrainians in an uncertain situation, for it

forced them to choose between two ephemeral identities: "Ukrainian;• which, 17 Martin T., The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism ín the Soviet Union, 1923-1939. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001; Smith J,, Red Nations: The Nationalities Experiences In and After the USSR, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 18 Quoted in: Liber G., S-oviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 1 192 Igor Torbakov in the sense of a modern, national identity, had little chance to establish ítself throughout Ulaaine, and "Soviet; which was still in the process of formation. ln effect, when the USSR collapsed in 1991, Ulaainians found themselves drifting between two rather hazy concepts: 19 On the other hand, the creation of the Soviet quasi federation adversely a:ffected the nation-building process of the Russians themselves. First, the official recognition,

within the USSRs federative structure, of the union national republics eliminated any possibility of effectively realizing the project of the "larger Russian nation; which was abandoned unfinished in the midst of Russias revolutionary time of troubles. Second, because of the constant overlapping of Soviet and Russian notions throughout the entire history of the USSR, the development ofRussian national consciousness was significantly impeded. vVhat exactly "Russianness" means still remains hazy. 20 III ln his perceptive essay "The Problem of Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Light of History; which came out in Prague in 1930, Petr Mikhailovich Bitsilli, a Russian émigré historian living in Sofia, pointed out that "the drive toward cultural and political secession only to a certain extent is a fruit of the [nationalist] intelligentsias liberalism. ln many cases the real although hidden - motives here are careerism, a desire to promote oneself, to play a role.

A new state rneans a multitude of new possibilities - parliarnentary seats, diplornatic posts, rninisterial portfolios ln a new capital a mpdest school teacher can count on getting a position of acadernician, a ~ornpany cornrnander - a position of the chief of General Staff21 What class or group of people in the post-Soviet Ukraine could benefit most from the countrys political secession? ln the almost total absence of a ri:J.ature nation, developed political culture, dernocratic institutions, or experienced counterelite, only the old Cornrnunist cadres were in a position to advance serious claims to leadership in the newly independent Ukrainian state. They simply had no strong competitors. Notably, as early as the 1920s, some of the 19 Subtelny ü, The Ambiguities of National Identity: The Case of Ukraine, in: Wolchik S.L, Zviglyanich V (eds), Ukraine: The Search Por a National Identity, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000, p. 4 20 Hosking G., Rulers and Victims: The

Russians in the Soviet Union, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. 21 föm;MJim1 II., J136paHHbte mpyObt no rjjullonozuu MocKBa, 1996~ p 134 Understanding Russian-Ukrainian Relations 193 most farsighted Ukrainian analysts, such as Viacheslav Lypynsky, a conservative thinker and historian from the Ukrainian interwar emigration, had predicted that the creation of an independent state would not be possible without cooperation between nationalists and Communists. 22 Their insights proved prescient: the momentous events of 1991 should not be viewed as the logical end of the protracted and heroic national-liberation struggle (which did not exist) but rather as a compromise struck by the three major groups making up the Ukrainian population. As a result, the wiliest Kyiv Communist apparatchiks, who were smart enough to understand that the only way to remain on top was to immediately turn their coats and masquerade as true nationalists, managed to set themselves free from their

Moscow masters and retain full political and economic control. Unlike the old nomenklatura, true nationalists (mostly western Ukrainians, the Rukh movement, and some intellectuals) did not receive anything tangible but still got the coveted symbolic prize, Ukraines independence - a dreamed-of goal but one that would have remained absolutely unattainable but for the deal with the Communists. And finally, the bulk of the narod - the people (mostly from the eastern and southern regions of the country, in particular the Donbas miners) who threw their overwhehning support behind the idea of independence in the December 1, 1991 referendum - hoped, first and foremost, for a better and more prosperous life in the bountiful "breadbasket of Europe: Soviet legacy directly influenced the way in which the historic compromise in Ukraine was achieved. 23 The nature of this compromise has to a large extent determined the future socio-political development of the country. When the Comrnunist

regirne crurnbled and the Soviet Union fell to pieces, the newly "independent" Russia, too, found itself with politically atomized.and ideologically disoriented masses at the bottom and the )mlk of the old elites at the top. Yet despite very sirnilar post-Soviet sodetal struchlres, Russia and U kraine differed dramatically in terms of perspectives on their respective post-irnperial condition. It would appear thai in Russia the newly acquired statehood did not occupy a prominent place either in the elite or mass corisciousness. On the contrary, it has been associated -with the Ioss of "space of national self-realization: and with the "phantom pains" caused by the loss of the parts of the former 22 For a discussion ofLypynskys political thinking, see: Motyl A., Viacheslav Lypynsky and the Ideology and Politics of Ukrainian Monarchism, "Canadian Slavonic Papers: Vol. 27 No! 1985, p 31-48 23 For a detailed analySis of the last six months of the Soviet Union,

with a particular focus on Ukrainiari developments, see: Plokhy S., The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union, Basic Books, 2014. 194 Igor Torbakov union state. Unlike in tbe other post-Soviet countries, where the significance of national independence has found its proper place among the basic political values of the "old new" elites, in Russia the fust euphoria caused by the "liberation from the imperial Center" has been replaced by a painful political hangover. Ever more popular among Moscow policy elite has become the understanding that the Soviet Union was in no way an obstacle to state self-determination but, on the contrary, provided a much broader space for this same self-determination than the newly baked Russian Federation. Such an attitude is well reflected in an article penned more than a decade ago by the political thinker Aleksandr Tsipko. ln his opinion, the state entity called the "Russian Federation is a "mere splinter of

the Russian Empire, mainly a union of Great Russians, Turkic peoples and Ugro-Finns:• He continues: "ln fact, a re-establishment of the union of Slavic republics of the former USSR would lead to the creation of a true [Russian] national state, similar to the present-day Federal Republic of GermanY:24 As for ordinary Russians, they never faced the problem of self-determination within the framework of the USSR, where they always regarded themselves as the national majority, regardless of their concrete place of residence. That is why most of them tend to associate the Russian Federation not so much with the acquisition of"their own state" as with its collapse. Thus a specific ideology has emerged in Russia in which the political elites nostalgia for the lost superpower status is being reinforced by the masses nostalgia for the lost territory, in terms of both the physical space and the space of the free and unimpeded social contacts. Vladimir Putins (in)famous

characterization of the Soviet Unions demise as the "major geopolitical catastrophe of the 20" century" has both clearly reflected this "sense ofloss" and appealed to it. ln Ukraine one can perceive a quite different trend. For Ukrainian elites, state sovereignty has become a dominant value, for it was Uhaines political independence that overnight turned the parochial and provincial Kyiv elite into a social group equal, in its political significance, to the elites of the leading European states. This steadily growing international prestige and the keen interest that influential forces in Western Europe and the United States have in Ukrainian political novices make Ukraines independence especially attractive for its elites. ln Ukrainian mass consciousness the value of independence was particularly high at the moment when the sovereign state had just been born - first of all, because of a pragmatic, although unfounded, idea that political independence 24 IJ)mKO

A., CMOJICÚn llU IIymuH nepeuzpamb TycuHCKOZO?, "He3aBHCHMM ra3eTa: 20/2/2001, http:/ /www.ngru/politics/2001-02-20/3 outplayhtml Understanding Russian-Ukrainian Relations 195 would immediately lead to prosperity. Oflate, the Ukrainian public attitude has become somewhat more ambivalent. On the one hand, the disintegration of the USSR continues to be viewed positively as an event thai prompted the emergence of "their own state" with its own historical path and ways of development. On the other hand, among certain segments of the population in Ukraines heavily industrialized and economically depressed eastern and southern provinces, independence has come to be associated with the losses caused by mass impoverishment, economic instability, poor governance, the breaking of social ties, and so forth. Yet whatever the ambiguities of public attitudes, numerous sociological surveys demonstrate that the bulk ofUkrainians support the countrys independence and territorial

integrity. These Ukrainians constitute the majority of the population in the majority ofUkraines regions over the full length of the post-1991 period. 05 IV The emergence of independent Ukrainian state and the rise of a distinct Ukrainian national identity are inseparably intertwined with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This fact is instructive as it confirms the thesis long advanced by the students of nationalism, namely thai "the emergence of cultural identity implies the fragmentation of a larger unity and is always experienced as a threat:26 As the veteran Harvard historian Roman Szporluk famously argued, the making of one nation entails the unmaking of another: the rise of particularist identities in the ex-Soviet republics leads to the demise of the overarching Soviet identity; nation-building in Ukraine compels the remaking of the Russian natic?n. 27 This 25 fp11u;a.K 51, Cmpacmi 3a Hau)oHani3MoM: cmapa icmopik: Ha HOBUÜ naO Ecei, KMiB: Kp11T11Ka, 2011, p. 322

The most recent poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in April 2014 confirms this trend. According to this survey, adear majority ofUkrainians (77%) agree that their country should remain united. ln thewestern and central regions, more than 90% support the countrfs unity; in the east and south (the regions along the Black. Sea and the border with Russia) a smaller majorit) (70%) also prefers unit) It is only in Crimea that more than half (54%) voiced support far the right to secede. See the full data in: Despite Concerns About Governance, Ukrainians Want to Remain One Country, Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 8/5/2014, http://www.pewglobal org/ 20 14/ 0S/08/ despite-concerns-about-governance-ulaainians-want-to- remain-onecountry/. 26 Friedman J., The Past in the Future: History and the Politics of Identity, American Anthropologist", VoL 94. No 4 1992, p 854 27 Szporluk R., From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State, "Daedalus: Vol 126 No. 3 1997, p 85-119

196 Igor Torbakov insight sheds light on the reasons why the Ulaainian national project raises so much concern in Russia - both arnong the elites and mass publics. Many Russians seem to be convinced that its successful realization would not only significantly diminish the number ofthe Russian people- imagined in terrns ofthe 19 th century "larger Russian nation concept- but also take away a huge chunk of their putative historical "national lands:08 Moreover, adding insult to injury, it would deprive the Russians of the precious and most ancient part of their history, that of the Kyiv Rus. If there is one phrase that has defined the relationship for generations of Russians, it is this: "Kyiv is the rnother of Russian cities: Taken frorn the ancient chronicle29, it was reproduced in dozens of textbooks both under the tsars and the Soviets. "Its more than brother Slavs;" notes Richard Lourie, explaining how a good number of Russians see things. "Kyiv is the

mother of Mother Russia, the nations babushka:30 To use Dmitry Furmans analogy again, it is as if one suddenly learned that his or her parents have another child, who now starts daiming a good part of the legacy one thought was his or her exclusively. 31 As both Russians and Ukrainians are compelled to construct their postSoviet identities largely out of the same historical material, the wrangles over the diverging interpretations of the shared history seem inevitable. Under the Soviets, Ukraines historical master narrative was almost completely devoid of the events and personalities that would symbolize Ulaainians striving for separateness or autonomy. This of course should come as no surprise as the overarching goal of the Soviet nationalities policy was to create conditions for the "brotherly sodalist nations" to "come closer together" and eventually "merge" to form a new social entity of a higher order - the Soviet people. Ukraines independence ushered

in a thorough revision of the national historical canon 28 Notably, according to President Putin, "Ukraines south-east is . Novorossiia (New Russia). Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev, Odessa were not part of Ukraine in tsarist times. These are the territories that were transferred to Ukraine by the Soviet government in the 1920s. Whydid they do i-i:? God knows" See: Ilynrn B.B, IIpKMaJf llUHUJl e BnaOuMupoM IIymuHbtM,Kremlinru, April 17, 2014, http:// kremlin.ru/transcripts/20796 29 This is a paraphrase of an entry in the Kyivan Primary Chronicle (Tale of Bygone Years) under the year 882: B nem 6390 (882) . M cen Oner, KIDDKa, B KvreBe, vr CKasarr Oner: "Ua 6y;ri;eT 9T0 MaTb ropop;aM pycCKMM: See: IIo6ecmb 6peMeHHbtx nem, IloroTOBKa TeKcTa LJ:.C Jfaxa"<IeBa IIep LJ:C TIJ1XaIeBa vr EA PoMaHoBa; rrop; pep; B.II Ap;pMaHonoM-ITepeTu; MocKBa: J1sp;-Bo AKap;eMMM Hayi< CCCP, 1950 30 Lourie R., Russias Darwinian Fight to Regain Crimea, Al Jazeera,

March 13, 2014, http :// america.alj azéera com/ opinions/2014/ 3 / crimea-ukraine-russiaputinnatohtml 31 <DypMaH ,U.E, PycCKue u yKpaUl-itlibl , p 6 Understanding Russian-Ukrainian Relations 197 that saw the "particularists" and "nationalists" such as !van Mazepa, Mykhailo Hrushevskiy, Symon Petlyura, Mykola Khvylyovy, and Stepan Bandera quickly crowding out the "heroes" of the erstwhile narrative which championed Ukraines "unity with Russia. "The past looks different these days from Kyiv (still more, from Lviv); notes Charles Emmerson. "Instead of Ukrainians cherishing their supporting role in Russias geopolitical greatness - which essentially means the power and prestige of the state Ukrainians have come to cherish alternative narratives of their history; based around freedom and resistance: 32 For its part, Russias newly emerging official canon can be characterized as an awkward arnalgam of the late imperial and Soviet

historiography. It is built around the notion of the "Slav Orthodox civilization and the concept of Russkii Mir (Russian World) - a variation on Pushkirís metaphor of the all-embracing "Russian sea receiving the inflowing "East Slavic rivers" - that upholds the idea of cultural and religious closeness of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians. While the Russian historical myth seeks to question Ukraines distinctiveness (and thus to undermine its right to sovereignty), the Ukrainian nationalist narrative responds by reasserting Ukraines distinctiveness and championing its efforts to forge a separate historical path. This is the crux of the matter: whereas Russias grand story emphasizes togetherness, the Ukrainian one stresses separateness.33 No wonder the two have clashed Here is a brief overview ofhow Russians and Ukrainians, using basically the same historical building-blocks, end up constructing different historiographic edifices. ln the Russian narrative Kyiv Rus

is conventionally portrayed ás the 32 Emmerson Ch., Ukraine and Russias History Wars, History Today, 4/3/2014, http:// ww-w-.historytodaycom/blog/2014/03/ukraine-and-russia%E2%80%99s-historywars 33 Some more perceptive Russian scholars have recognised this crucial difference. Speaking at a Russian-Ukrainian seminar in Moscow in 1997, K.M Kantor pointed out that "separation from the empire" was the central element of the Ukrainian national thought, whereas in Russia "the emphasis had been on gathering and unitY: He continued: "ln the past, even democratically minded Russian intellectuals could not understand Ukrainians desire for self-determination: See: Poccuüc,wyKpaw-imuü Oualloz 8 eaponeűcKOM KoHmeKcme, IloJIMc: No. 3 1997, p 180-181 Quoted in: Tolz V., Ri!thinking Russian-Ukrainian Relations: A New Trend in NationBuilding in PöSt-C0mmunist Russia, "Nations and Nationalism: Vol 8 No 2 2002, p. 245 198 Igor Torbakov comrnon cradle of the three

brotherly East Slavic nations, 34 while Ukrainian nationalist canon treats it as an ancient Ukrainian state. Por Russians, the Union of Brest (!596) is an example of the aggressive Western (Catholic, Polish) "spiritual expansion into the lands of Orthodox Rus. (Note thai the Uniate Church was banned both in the Russian Empire and in the Soviet Union.) For Ukrainians, the union of Kyiv metropolitanate with Rome rnarks a complex and controversial development that, first, prompted the emergence in Ukrainian and Belorusian lands of a distinct identity ("Ruthenian nation) opposed to the church Union and then eventually led to the transformation of the Uniate Church into one of Ukraines national churches. Russian official historiography (both pasi and present) treats the Pereyaslav Agreement of 1654 between Muscovy and the Ukrainian Cossacks as an act of "reunification" between the two paris of the divided Rus - an actin which the Left-Bank Ukraine merged its historical

destiny with Russiás. Far Ukrainians, Pereyaslav is nothing more than a tactical military alliance that the Russian tsars took advantage of to suppress the Cossack autonomy. The year 1709 comes as yet another important milestone producing contrasting historical perspectives Peter the Greats victory in the battle of Poltava has catapulted Russia to a status of one of Europes major great powers. Yet what Russians regard as their glorious triumph, Ukrainians see as their major tragedy: Hetman Mazepas siding -with the losing party - the Swedes - led to further subjugation of the Ukrainian lands by the rising Russian Empire. Raised on Pushkins verse, generations ofRussians would see Mazepa through the great bards eyes: as a ")udah and a "snake" - the epithets Pushkin used to characterize the "traitorous" Cossack Hetman in his poem Poltava (1829), while Russiás Orthodox clergy still continues to anatheil)atize the "oath-breaker Mazepá in their churches.

Mazepintsy (along with the more recent terms Petlyurovtsy and Banderovtsy) is a RussiaÚ slur for "disloyal" - that is, separatist-rninded - Ukrainians who seek to undermine a "pan-Russian unity of brotherly Slavic peoples; Yet for many Ukrainians, Mazepa is a tragic and heroic figure who sought to secure autonomy for his fellow Cossacks but failed, 34 It is noteworthy that President Putin upholds this view. As far as this part [of Russian state], Ukraine, is concerned," Putin said recently; "it is a land and we understand and remember that we were born, as I said, within a common Ukrainian Dnieper [River] baptismal font; Rus Vfa.s born there, and we all [Russians and Ukrainians] come from there: See: ITynrn B.B, I1Hmep6b10 IIepBoMy KaHany u aieHmcmBy AccomuJÜmeO IIpecc, Kremlin.ru, 4/9/2013, http;/ /kremlinru/transcripts/19143 Understanding Russian-Ukrainian Relations 199 being crushed by the formidable and ruthless enemy. His audacious struggles won

him a place in the Ukrainian national pantheon and his likeness is duly reproduced on the ten hryvnya bili. Arguably, Ukrainians experiences during the tumultuous 20 th century gave rise to the deepest and most acrimonious divides in the realm of historical memories and interpretations. The chaotic and bloody period of 1917-1920 is characterized in contemporary Ukrainian historiography as Vyzvolni Zmahannya (War of Independence) that saw a succession of insipient Ukrainian state entities (the Ukrainian Peoples Republic, the Hetmanate, the Directory, and the Western Ukrainian Peoples Republic in Eastern Galícia) desperately struggling to achieve self-determination along the lines of Wilsonian principles. ln the Russian narrative, this same period is subsumed under the generic rubric of civil war in which its main protagonists - the Reds and the Whites - while mercilessly fighting each other, were also fighting for the Russia "one and indivisible; thereby denying Ukrainians the

right to separate political identity." Finally, there is a particularly divisive period of "high Stalinism" that also incorporates the atrocious years ofWorld War II. Ukraine, as one commentary contends, "was the deadliest place on earth between 1933 and 1945:36 Three events stand out as the ones that produced the greatest disagreements between Ukraines and Russias official stories. The first is Holodomor (the Great famine of 1932-33) Kyiv insists it was a rnan-made famine, effectively, genocide, specifi.cally tar~ geting Ukrainian peasants; Moscow would counter, arguing the famine was an unfortunate consequence of the flawed collectivization which also hit the other agricultural regions of the Soviet Union. The second is World War II The currently prevalent Ukrainian interpretation is that it was essentially a Soviet-Nazi conflict with Ukraine caught in the middle and devas1ated by the ruthless policies of the two totalitarian tyrants. For most Russians, the

conflict is the Great Patriotic War in which Russians and Ukrainians (as well as other brotherly 35 Again, Putin appears to treat this period in. precisely the same way "vThat is curious; he notes, "is that both the Red and the vThite camps were struggling to the death, millions perished in the course of that struggle, but they never raised the question of Ukraines secession. Both the Reds and the vThites proceeded from the principle of [territorial] integrity of the Russian state: See: Ibid. 36 Snyder T., Ukrainian Bxtremists Will Only Triumph IfRussia Invades, "The New Republic; 17/4/2014~ http:/ /www;newrepubliccom/article/117395/historic-ukrainian-russianrelations-impact-maidan-revolution 200 Igor Torbakov Soviet nations) fought side by side and achieved a glorious victory over the mortal enemy- the victorythat brought the Soviet Union enormous symbolic capital and made it one of the two world superpowers. The third controversial episode is the activities of

the Organization ofUkrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the war and in the postwar years. The official Ukrainian narrative presents these nationalist activists as freedom fighters: even when they committed atrocities towards Poles and Jews and tactically sided with the Nazis, they were struggling to achieve a lofty goal - Ihat ofUkraines independence. The Russian story characterizes the OUN fighters as ultra-nationalists, anti-Semites and despicable Nazi collaborators who do not deserve to be put on equal footing with the Red Armyveterans. 37 Vvhat makes the story of differing historical interpretations even more complex is Ukraines ovm internal divisions. As they say, nomen est omen Historically, Ukraine (which means borderland in Ulaainian) has emerged as an amalgamation of borderlands - "ukraínes" - of the three empires: Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman. This process produced significant structural legacies at the regional level Thus,

besides the pronounced socioeconomic cleavage (heavily industrialized south-eastern heartland vs. less developed and largely agrarian west) and the corresponding ethno-linguistic (and to a somewhat lesser extent religious) fault-lines, residents of various Ukrainian regions are also divided due to their differing attitudes towards Ukraines past and its relations with Russia. "Ukraine finds it difficult to reconcile the political culture and orientation of its formerly Cossack, Polish and Austrian west-central lands with its eastern and southern territories, settled in the days of the, Russian Empire: acknowledges Serhii Plokhy, a prominent historian and director pf the Harvard Ulaainian Research Institute. 38 37 For a more comprehensive discussion ofhow the past is represented in Russias and Ukraines historical narratives, see Plokhy S., Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008; KacbHHOB r., MI-vrnep A, PoccUJl-Yílpaw-w: 1WK

numemur ucmopUJl. fiuanozu, neK14uu, cmambu, MocKBa: Pocrntí:cKJ1M rocy;qapcrneHHhIM rJMamuapHbIM ymrnepcYITet, 2011; The Convolutions of Historical Politics, Ed. by A Miller and M Lipman Budapest: Central European UniversityPress, 2012. 38 Plokhy S., The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 361 Understanding Russian-Ukrainian Relations 201 V Historical canons defined as they are now in Ukraine and Russia appear to serve as a means of division rather than shared experience. As the Ukraine crisis started to unfold and especially following the toppling of the Yanukovych regime in the Maidan February Revolution, the Russian leadership deployed its highly ethnicized narrative to drive a wedge into Ukraines existing ethno-linguistic cleavages. Kremlin-controlled media outlets have sought to justify Russias interference by portraying what has happened in Kyiv as a triumph of nationalist and

"fascíst" forces (the direct descendants of the war-time Banderovtsy) whose corning to power threatens the lives and security of the Russian and Russianspeaking populatíon in Ukraine. Its true thai language and ethnicity have been politicized regularly sínce 1991, particularly during electíon carnpaigns. But in real life (that is, unless politicians whip up ethnic passions to achieve their ends), ethnicity and language are not the dorninant issues in Ukraine; sociological surveys demonstrate that ordinary folks are much more concerned with the issues of personal security, rule oflaw and corruption. The real political divide in the country is not that which supposedly separates Ukraines western and eastern regions. It is a fault line, where on one side stands a host of emerging and assertive identities (including liberals, the charnpions of a Ukrainian civic nation, radical and less radical nationalists, and others); on the other side are found those clinging to a

post-Soviet identity, one characterized by political passivity and a reliance on state paternalism. This post-Soviet identity is spread unevenly across Ukraine, being concentrated predorninantly, but by no means exclusively, in the east and south. Arguably, Crirnea has the highest concentration of people who would characterize themselves as "Russians: But in Ukraines current socio-political context, it might be more acéurate to define the bulk of them as being post-Soviet (or sirnply Soviet) in their outlook, rather than "Russian: The toppling of the Yanukovych regirne created an opportunity for a bold political experirnent, one largely aimed at accommodating Ukraines multiple identities and opening up political and econornic possibilities to a rnuch broader slice of society. This desire to open up society is what strikes at the very heart of what I call a "post-Soviet condition - a foundation on which the Putinist political and econornic system rests. ln the broad

historical view, tb.e disintegration of the Soviet Union was always bound to be a protracted process. True, the Soviet Union as a state (or, in a memorable phrase, "~s a geopolitical reality") did indeed disappear overnight. But the decomposition Üf Soviet institutions, practices, and tb.e political mindset have taken decades, and the process is still going on. Among the characteristic 202 Igor Torbakov features of post-Soviet condition are the huge spillover of the old (Soviet) elites; a state in which power is wielded by a narrow, tight-knit group of people who cannot be easily removed from power; and a system in which rule oflaw does not exist, the legislature is rubber-stamp in nature and there is no genuine space for political and economic competition. Ukraines post-independence experience has a somewhat typical post-Soviet trajectory Upon gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine was elfectively an empty shell, not a full-blown nation-state (or rather state-nation)

with its distinct identity This shell was eventually filled largely with post-Soviet content: authoritarian political practices, crony capitalism, and the merger of politics and big business thai stifled competition. The 2004 "Orange Revolution in Ukraine - the first attempt in Kyiv to overcome post-Soviet condition - failed in large part because of petty political bickering among the "Orange" victors. Thai infighting paved the way for the rise of the venal Yanukovych regime. The current crisis is Ukraines second attempt to break out of the post-Soviet mold. The success or failure of this attempt will largely depend on whether those Ukrainians who carried out the February Revolution manage to forge Ukraines distinct national (civic) identity, one that will be embraced by all Ukrainian citizens irrespective of their ethnic origin and linguistic preferences, and build the new institutions that will facilitate good governance. This reform program is precisely what Ukraines

civic activists generally refer to when they invoke the notion of the "European path and express their desire to "associate with the EU: Given Putin Russias growing anti-Westernism and a desire to retain a sphere of influence which would comprise Ukraine and where post-Soviet (and utterly un-European) rules of the garne would prevail make the Kyiv revolutionaries "European orientation look not just as a pqlitical but also as a "civilizational" choice. The fact that most Ukrainians are not aware of the details of the Association Agreement with the :ÉU and have a vague idea of how the Brussels bureaucratic bodies function is beside the point. Those in Ukraine who opt for "Europe" simply want to put an. end to ugly post-Soviet practices (such as rapacious crony capitalism, corruption, nepotism, selective application of justice, etc.) and foster the rule of law, secure property rights, and protection of human dignity - the values they associate,

correctly, with Europe. Russias propaganda machine has been relentlessly feeding domestic publics and the population ofUkraines south-east regions the diet of ethnichatred, brutally "othering" the Maidan revolutionaries. Yet the fundarnental significance of the current political turmoil in Ukraine lies precisely in the attempt to go beyond divisions caused, by Tegionalism and conflicting historical memories, create a new political mindset and build a new Ukrainian identity on a qualitatively new Understanding Russian-Ukrainian Relations 203 foundation. vThat Euromaidan stands for is, first and foremost, a value-based vision of Ukraine as part of a wider Europe. It is adherence to a set of values born at the dawn of European modernity that could - and should - become a cornerstone of the overarching Ukrainian national identity. To be sure, what is truly important about these values - rule of law, division between public and private spheres, human rights, freedom - is not

so much that they are European (although, historically, they are) as thai they are universal. They appeal equally, and irrespective of concrete cultural context, to a Frenchman, a Ukrainian, and a Russian. Thats why the assertion of Ukraines European value-based identity appears to be the most troublesome aspect of Ukrainian developments for the Kremlin leadership. VI It would be too facile to conclude that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict reflects basic divergences between the two political cultures, meaning that Russians are inherently authoritarian and Ukrainians are freedom-loving. Every national culture contains various, and oftentimes contradictory, strands Yet it is undoubtedly very diffi.cult to run against the grain ofhistorical legacies For most of its modern history, Russia has been a powerful and autocratically ruled empire in which the might of the state and raison detat always trumped individual and group freedoms. 39 vThen confronted with the perceived security challenge,

Russia would spare no effort to rally the populace round the flag and respond with nationalist bravado, risking containment and international isolation. Remarkably, Pushkins 1831 ode "To the Slanderers of Russia seems to be paradigmatic al;o in this respect. Pushkin was alarmed by the carnpaign in- Europe (mostly in F~ahce) calling for the military support for Polish rebels in Warsaw, and he defied this European challenge with those celebrated words: Will not the Russian land arise from Perm to Tavrida, From the cold rocks ofFinland to the flaming Kolkhida [Colchis], From the shaken Kremlin to the walls of immovable China, Gleaming with a bristle ofbayonets? 39 When exp1aining why the majority of Russians support Putins Ukraine policy, Boris Kolonitskil, a leading Russian historian from St. Petersburg, specifically pointed to the fact that "Russian idelltity is linked to empire: See: Kolonitskii B., Why Russians Back Putin on Ukrailie, "New York Times", 12/3/2014,

http:/ /www.nytimescom/2014/03/12/ opinion/why-russians-back-putin-on-ukraine.html?hp&rref=opinion& r=l 204 Igor Torbakov Russian patriotic public was ecstatic about Pushkins new oeuvre with Petr Chaadayev (1794-1856), one ofRussias most origiual and controversial political thinkers, calling him Russias true "national poet:40 Yet not everyone was happy. Pushkius close friend, Prince Petr Vyazemsky (I 792-1878), did not hide his criticism of what he called Pushkins "trench-coat poetry" (shiuelnaia poeziia). Vyazemsky was among the first Russian intellectuals to note that military might alone cannot rnake a nation great and draw attention to what can be termed Russias perennial deficit in social capital - a problern that will define Russias relations with Europe for the next two centuries. "Why would a resurgent Europe love us?" he asked. "Are we contributing a single penny to the treasury of universal enlightenment? We function as a brake

vis-Cl-vis the movements of peoples towards the gradual rnoral and political improvement. We are outside a resurgent Europe and yet we still gravitate towards it ." Vyazemsky also mocked Pushldns "geographic fanfaronades" - his boastful talk of Russias immense size: "Is it really good, is it a reason for being happy and hubristic that we lie so overstretched, thai here [in Russia] the distance between the two thoughts is five thousand miles ."41 Prince Vyazemsky would surely be surprised if he knew that his criticism was shared by a former Ukraiuian serf Thai was Taras Shevchenko - Pushkius opposite number in Ukrainian national pantheon. Not unlike the Russian noble, Shevchenko was skeptical about the habit of equating the nations greatness with its physical size. But he appeared to have gone one better than Vyazemsky and pointed to the link between the Russian obsession with territorial aggrandizement and the countrys autocratic rule. ln his 1846 poem The

Caucasus - which in itself was a response to Pushkins Byronic poem Prisoner of the Caucasus - Shevchenko farnously (and sarcastically) described the Russian Empire as avast country where 40 ln a letter to Pushkin, penned habitually in French, Chaadayev congratulated the poet: "Enfin, vous voila poete national. " See: CoLfUHeHUJl u nucbMa IIJI LfaaOaeBa IIo;n; pe;n;. M feprneH3uHa B 2-x T MocKBa, 1913 Vol 1, p 166 41 B.aseMcKwl1 TIA, CmapaH sanuCHaH KHUJKKa, Pe;n; 11 npHM JL Iirns6ypr Tiemrnrpa;:i;: J1s;n;. 1mcaTenel1 «Tiemmrpa;n;», 1929 3arrwcb 70 Understanding Russian-Ukrainian Relations 205 From the Moldavian to the Finn Everything is silent in all languages, For . it is happy 42 Was this indirect literary duel between the two national poets43 an early harbinger of the things to corne? 42 IlleBieHKO T., 3i6pam--m meopiB Y 6 T, KMiB, 2003 Vol 1, p 345 Translation is mine 43 It would be worthwhile to note here that in the early 1990s, Joseph Brodsky, ~u~sias

outstanding 20 th century poet and Nobel laureate,- weighed in on this litefarypolitical dispute. Brodsky, steeped in the high imperial culture ofhis native Leningrad/ St. Petersburg, appeared to have no doubts whatsoever as to who -Alexander Pushkin or Taras Shevchenko - would ultimately come out triumphant in this "dueI: In a poem entitled "ün Ukrainian Independence (one, it must be noted, that was never included in the body of his published work), Brodsky, seemingly wounded by Ukraines 1991 "secession; grimly warned the Ukrainians that on their deathbed most of them would likely remember the "lines penned by Alexander" and not "Taras nonsense": 6y,n;ere BbI xp11ner1,, u;aparran Kpa:tt Marpaca,crpoqKJ.1 H3 AlreKcaHp;pa, a He 6pexmo Tapaca. See: AemopcKaJl peOaKUiUH cmuxoB M.BpoOcKozo <Ha 1-tesaBuCuMocmb Y,cpaUHbt KoMMeHmapuü H.E Top6aHeBCKOÜ 17/5/2008, http:/ /ng68livejournalcom/123368 html. For further diStussion, see Gessen K, A Note on

Brodsky and Ukraine, "New Yorker: August 23, 2011, http://www.newyorkercom/on1ine/blogs/books/20ll/08/ a-note-on-brodsky-and-ukraine-1.html