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INTRODUCTION Ò P E A C E AN D SEC U RI TY UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? Ukrainian, Russian and German experts share the opinion that a quick settlement of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is impossible, and the popular “simple” recipes for settlement cause scepticism among the surveyed specialists. Ò There is no consensus among experts on the optimal model of coexistence between Ukraine and Russia, but there is a shared vision of areas of interaction that are the most and the least risky for bilateral relations. Results of the Expert Survey Ò According to the surveyed experts, the U.S and the EU are the external players that have the best opportunities to contribute to the settlement of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Maksym Khylko December 2021 1 P E A C E AN D SEC U RI TY UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? Content Foreword 2 1 Key Findings 3 2 Research Design 5 3 Research Results 7

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 Not much optimism for the short- and mid-term perspectives.7 Factors that could improve/deteriorate relations, reduce/increase risk of confrontation.9 Common challenges and potential areas of cooperation.15 Is Russia ready to perceive Ukraine as an independent country?.18 Models of coexistence.19 Potential facilitators.20 4 Prospects for Further Research 22 1 FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION – UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? FOREWORD After more than seven years of the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict, there is no clear vision of the prospects for relations between the two countries either at the official or expert levels. Existing studies focus mainly on searching ways to cease armed confrontation and to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Undoubtedly, the peaceful settlement and the return of territories and citizens are priorities for Ukraine, but achieving these goals also requires a comprehensive vision of relations

with Russia taking into account the broad context, as well as shaping a strategic vision that would help lay the groundwork for conflict-free coexistence in the future. three countries share the idea of a complex nature of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia that cannot be quickly settled, especially with the help of the “simple” recipes. The study shows that solutions that seem obvious at first glance will not always be truly effective given the wider context and associated risks. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba has repeatedly rightly stated that Ukraine needs to “learn to live with Russia.” It is impossible to do that without a sober analysis of various factors of bilateral relations, objective assessment of interests and security considerations of all stakeholders, including key global actors, taking into account the development prospects for the full range of bilateral and multilateral relations. The organizations performing the research

express special gratitude to the project coordinator of the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine Maria Koval-Honchar for her valuable contribution to the project implementation. We hope the results of the expert survey will be useful not only to officials, diplomats, politicians and experts involved in the elaboration of public policy, but also to a wide range of citizens seeking a better understanding of interstate relations. MARCEL RÖTHIG Resident Representative in Ukraine and Moldova, Friedrich Ebert Foundation In this context, the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova decided to hold an expert survey on key factors and prospects of Ukraine–Russia relations, involving experts from Ukraine and Russia, as well as Germany which is an active participant in the Normandy negotiating format as well as an important political and economic partner of Ukraine and

Russia. MAKSYM KHYLKO Director of the Russian and Belarusian Studies Program at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” The project did not aim to embrace the positions of the whole expert communities of Ukraine, Russia and Germany but to get the views of professionals with expertise on the relationship between Ukraine and Russia, which could provide the foundation for preliminary conclusions and help identify the directions for further researches. It should be noted that the results of the study reflect the generalized positions of the experts surveyed, not the institutions they are employed as well as organizations and specialists who held this study. The survey reveals both the representative differences in the views of experts from different countries on some issues, and an unexpected similarity of assessments on others. In particular, the study indicates that the experts of the 2 KEY FINDINGS 1 KEY FINDINGS Without claiming to reflect the positions of the whole

expert communities of Ukraine, Russia and Germany, the study provided an opportunity to get views of professionals with expertise in Ukraine–Russia relations, as well as to make some preliminary conclusions important for shaping further research. The methodology and detailed presentation of the expert survey results are specified in the relevant sections of this publication. This section presents several conclusions that reflect both the key trends identified as well as a few rather unexpected results. lute majority of Ukrainian experts was predictable). Even more surprisingly, Russian experts represent the smallest share of those who believe that Ukraine’s accession to the EU would have negative consequences for Ukraine-Russia relations (meanwhile, significantly more Ukrainian and German experts express the corresponding cautiousness). 5. While a relative majority of the surveyed experts from all three countries favoured the positive impact of possible Ukraine’s EU accession on

Ukraine–Russia relations, only a majority of Ukrainian experts believe in the same effect of Ukraine’s joining NATO. Instead, the majority of German and Russian experts consider it as a factor increasing the risk of confrontation. Predictably, the opposite reflections are expressed on the option of non-alignment policy / neutrality – it is supported by the majority of Russian and German experts, but by only a quarter of Ukrainian experts. 1. The surveyed experts from all the three countries share the idea of the impossibility of a simple and quick settlement of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. For the short (1-2 years) and mid-term (3-5 years) perspectives, the majority of the experts predict the maintenance of the current status quo, or further deterioration of political relations and the curtailment of economic cooperation, as well as military escalations along the contact line in ORDLO (certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions). The optimistic point is that

only a few experts believe a full-scale military escalation between Russia and Ukraine is likely. 6. The majority of the surveyed experts, including Ukrainian, do not share the widespread reservations that improving EU and U.S relations with Russia would have a negative impact on relations between Ukraine and Russia. The majority of the experts also do not believe that further extension of Western sanctions against Russia or minimizing the volume of Ukraine-Russia trade would have a significant impact on relations between the two countries and the risks of their confrontation. 2. Unexpectedly, Russian experts were those who expressed optimism looking at the long-term perspective (6-15 years): two thirds of them believe that ORDLO will be returned to Ukraine within this time window, and economic and political cooperation between Ukraine and Russia will intensify. In contrast, only 15% of Ukrainian and 11% of German experts believe in such a scenario (at the same time, the majority of

them predict more pessimistic scenarios). 7. German and Russian experts more than their Ukrainian colleagues expect the potentially positive impact of successful reforms and economic growth in Ukraine on the development of its relations with Russia. At the same time, experts from all three countries agree that confrontational risks in relations with Russia would increase in case if a deep economic crisis takes place in Ukraine. Therefore, strengthening the economy is important for Ukraine, including in the context of enhancing security. 3. The majority of the surveyed experts of the three countries adhere to the position that the course of the ­Ukraine–Russia confrontation depends rather on the policy of the Russian Federation than on Ukraine. At the same time, Ukrainian and German experts do not expect significant changes in the Kremlin’s policy after the transit of power in Russia, presumably believing that the main causes of the conflict are broader than Putin’s personal

position. 8. Interesting trends are observed in the experts’ assessment of the factors that shape Russian citizens’ perception of Ukrainians as a separate nation with the right to an independent country with its own domestic and foreign policies. German and Russian experts much more often than their Ukrainian colleagues distinguish the building of strong democratic institutions, the rule of law, strong 4. Rather unexpectedly, a relative majority of Russian experts support the idea that Ukraine’s accession to the EU would have positive consequences for the development of Ukraine–Russia relations (support for this factor by abso3 FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION – UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? economy and high standard of living among these factors. Meanwhile, Ukrainian experts distinguish the EU and/or NATO accession to be the most convincing factor. 12. According to the balance of positive and negative assessments by the surveyed experts, the

following areas are potentially the most promising and least risky for bilateral interaction between Ukraine and Russia: economics; climate change and environmental protection; healthcare; fight against crime. 9. Despite the widespread in Ukraine opinion that the majority of Russian citizens will never perceive Ukrainians as a separate nation and Ukraine as an independent state, only one Ukrainian expert chose the corresponding answer option. 13. None of the options for answering the question “Relations between which countries could be considered as the optimal model for coexistence of Ukraine and Russia?” gained the support of more than a third of the surveyed experts from Ukraine, Russia or Germany. On average, the experts chose the following models of coexistence more often than other options: Finland–USSR; Poland–Germany; Canada–USA; Croatia–Serbia. 10. The majority of the surveyed experts are sure that the imperial ideology and belief in the concepts of the

“Russian world” and the “triune Russian people” are the factors that prevent the Russian high-ranking officials from perceiving Ukraine as an independent country. In addition, among such factors the experts most often mention the following: concerns of the current Russian leadership that the potential success of a democratic Ukraine will become an attractive example for the citizens of Russia and other countries, which Moscow considers its zone of privileged interests; conviction of the Russian leadership that Ukraine’s independence poses a threat to Russia’s security; ambition to include Ukraine in Russian integration projects, including the economic ones; weakness of Ukraine’s economy. 14. The surveyed experts from the three countries share the position on the external players who have the best opportunities to contribute to the settlement of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia – the United States and the European Union. It is noteworthy that Russian and German

experts gave an equal number of votes to both actors, while Ukrainian experts gave a significant advantage to the United States. It should be noted that none of the surveyed experts chose the United Nations – that is an important indicator of assessing the effectiveness of this organization, the Charter of which lists maintain of peace as the first purpose. 11. While suggesting their own options of factors / conditions that can reduce the risk of full-scale military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, experts from all three countries with minor variations emphasised the need to increase Ukraine’s defence capabilities, in particular with the help of the West. Ukrainian and German experts suggested similar ideas on the need to strengthen Ukraine’s bilateral military cooperation with the partner countries, as well as increase Western investment in Ukrainian economy. Several Ukrainian and Russian experts shared the idea of ​​providing Ukraine with international security

guarantees in the form of bilateral or multilateral agreements. 15. The surveyed Ukrainian experts place less hope on the potential contribution of NGOs to the settlement of the conflict than their Russian and German colleagues do. The most popular answer of Ukrainian experts on possible role of NGOs was about their contribution to solving the problems of human rights violations, particularly in Crimea and ORDLO. Meanwhile, Russian and German experts more often chose the options of offering expert platforms for discussions on issues that are taboo or too sensitive for politicians; reducing tensions and building confidence between Ukrainian and Russian peoples; increasing interest of Ukrainian and Russian societies in settling conflict. 4 RESEARCH DESIGN 2 RESEARCH DESIGN The goals of the study were to find out how the experts from Ukraine, Russia and Germany see the development of relations between Ukraine and Russia in the short, mid and long term perspectives; which factors

affect the bilateral relations – positively or negatively; how to avoid further deterioration and escalation; what could be the optimal model for coexistence of two countries; what external actors could contribute to settlement between Ukraine and Russia; how could civil society actors contribute to this settlement. 3 open questions, and 1 closed without the own answer option. The survey was performed using Google Forms, links to which were sent exclusively to the experts invited to take part in the survey. The experts filled out the questionnaire in June – July 2021. The selection of experts to participate in the survey was carried out in the process of consultations between the Russian and Belarusian Studies Program of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation offices in Kyiv, Moscow and Berlin, given that experts from these countries were invited to participate in the survey. The study included three main stages: elaboration of a

questionnaire, survey of experts, analysis of the survey results. The expert survey was performed using a self-completion questionnaire method for specialists in Ukrainian-Russian relations – experts from three countries: Ukraine, Russia and Germany. The selection of these three states is stipulated by the following reason: 1) Ukraine and Russia are parties to the conflict and these countries are the object of study; 2) Germany is an active mediator in the Normandy negotiating format, as well as an important political and trade partner of both Ukraine and Russia. The project did not aim to interview a large number of experts and embrace the positions of the whole expert communities of Ukraine, Russia and Germany. It aimed at getting the views of professionals with expertise on the relationship between Ukraine and Russia that could provide the foundation for preliminary conclusions and help identify the directions for further researches. The list of experts to participate in the

survey included competent specialists in Ukrainian-Russian relations who had relevant expertise experience on topic studied and showed a tendency towards objectivity in their professional assessments and political impartiality in expert work. Given that the research topic is more politically sensitive for Ukrainian experts as citizens of the country that is the victim of aggression, it was decided to interview more Ukrainian experts than their Russian and German counterparts, and to display the survey results in percentages for each country separately. The elaboration of a questionnaire for experts followed several stages. Initially, a group of experts of the Russian and Belarusian Studies Program of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” compiled a list of questions meeting the goals of the study, and offered various answer options based on the principles of academic objectivity and impartiality. The preliminary questionnaire was suggested for evaluation to the specialists

of the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine to make suggestions, clarifications and additions. Subsequently, three Ukrainian independent experts, specialists in Ukrainian-Russian relations and conflict studies, were asked to assess the compliance of the updated questionnaire with the goals of the study and the principle of objectivity. Taking into account the comments made, the final questionnaire was formed. In order to comply with the principle of proportionality, the questionnaires were sent to the experts one by one according to separate lists on Ukrainian, Russian and German experts until the number of questionnaires predetermined by the research objectives was filled in: 20 questionnaires completed by Ukrainian, 9 by Russian and 9 by German experts. Due to the political sensitivity of the topic, inclusion of the experts’ names and affiliations to the general list of respondents was optional. The right to anonymity was exercised by four Ukrainian, four

Russian and one German experts. The questionnaire contains 15 questions, of which 11 are closed with the possibility to offer own answer, 5 FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION – UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? Analysis of survey results centage (separately for experts from Ukraine, Russia and Germany) and rounded to whole numbers. The sum of the answers to some questions may differ from 100%, because in several cases individual experts did not answer all the questions, and in some others cases, instead of choosing from the proposed options, the experts provided their own answers. After the experts completed the questionnaires, the survey results were summarized, systematised, analysed and presented in the form of conclusions and charts with comments to them. To make the comparison relevant and to ease the perception of the survey results, the latter are presented as a per- 6 RESEARCH RESULTS 3 RESEARCH RESULTS 9 Research results Not much optimism for the

short- tion andwill mid-term curtail, butperspectives there will be no military escalation 3.1 NOT MUCH OPTIMISM FOR THE between Russia and Ukraine – such development is exSHORT- AND MID-TERM PERSPECTIVES pected by 33% of Russian, 33% of German and 25% Experts from all three countries generally are not too of Ukrainianabout experts; Experts from all three countries generally are not too optimistic the development of relations – there will be military the contact line in optimistic about the development of relations between between Ukraine and Russia in the short term (1-2 years) perspective. Atescalations best, theyonbelieve that the ORDLO – this option is considered as the most likely by Ukraine and Russia in the short term (1-2 years) perspecstatus quo will remain, although deterioration of political relations and military escalations on the 30% of Ukrainian, 22% of Russian and 22% of Gertive. At best, they believe that the status quo will remain, contact line in ORDLO are

also likely (see Chart 1). The man mostexperts. frequent answers of the experts are the although deterioration of political relations and military esfollowing: calations on the contact line in ORDLO are also likely (see answering the most same likely question, but of about the midChart 1). The most frequent answers the experts the isWhen  current status quo will of remain – thisare option considered as the by 44% surveyed term (3-5 years) perspective, surveyed experts from all following: Russian, 40% of Ukrainian and 33% of German experts; three countries most often express the opinion that po– current status quo will remain – this option is considlitical relations willwill deteriorate cooperation  political relations will deteriorate, economic cooperation curtail, and but economic there will be no ered as military the mostescalation likely by 44% of surveyed Russian, will curtail, but there will be no military escalation between between Russia and Ukraine – such

development is expected by 33% of 40% of Russian, Ukrainian 33% and 33% of German experts; Russia and Ukraine: 44% of Russian, 35% of Ukrainian of German and 25% of Ukrainian experts; – political relations will deteriorate, economic cooperaand 22% of German experts (see Chart 2).  there will be military escalations on the contact line in ORDLO – this option is considered as the most likely by 30% of Ukrainian, 22% of Russian and 22% of German experts. Chart 1. Chart 1.inHow will Ukraine-Russia relations develop How will Ukraine-Russia relations develop the SHORT-term (1-2 years) perspective? (one answer) in the SHORT-term (1-2 years) perspective? (one answer) 40% 44% 33% Current status quo 0% 0% 11% Full-scale military escalation between Russia and Ukraine 30% 22% 22% Military escalations on the contact line in ORDLO 25% Political relations deteriorate, economic cooperation curtails, but no military escalation 33% 33% 5% 0% 0% Economic cooperation intensifies,

despite current level of political confrontation & military conflict in ORDLO Conflict in ORDLO is frozen with help of Normandy format, economic & political relations improved 0% 0% 0% International peacekeeping mission is deployed in ORDLO, economic & political relations improved 0% 0% 0% ORDLO is returned to Ukraine, no changes on Crimea, economic & political relations improved 0% 0% 0% Military conflict is over, ORDLO & Crimea returned to Ukraine, economic & political relations improved 0% 0% 0% 0% Ukrainian experts 20% Russian experts 7 40% 60% 80% 100% German experts When answering the same question, but about the mid-term (3-5 years) perspective, surveyed experts from all three countries most often express the opinion that political relations will deteriorate and FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION – UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? Meanwhile we observe some differences with the second most frequent choice option. Among

Russian (33%) and German (22%) experts the second most frequently chosen option is the following: military escalations on the contact line in ORDLO. But among Ukrainian experts, the second and third place among the most frequently selected options are shared by the following options (with 20% each): current status quo will remain; and economic cooperation between Russia and Ukraine will intensify, despite remaining of the current level of political confrontation and military conflict in ORDLO. As for the long-term (6-15 years) perspective, the most widely chosen option can be met only among the answers of Russian experts – 67% of them believe that ORDLO will be returned to Ukraine, but the issue of Crimea will remain as it is now, while economic cooperation between Ukraine and Russia will intensify and the political climate of relations will improve. At the same time, this option was chosen by only 15% of Ukrainian and 11% of German experts (see Chart 3). In contrast to this

relatively optimistic view of the Russian 10 experts, there is no univocally preferrable choice of certain 10 Proposing own answer options, one Russian expert notes options among their Ukrainian and German colleagues. Meanwhile we observe some differences with the second most frequent choice option. Among Russian that further course of events will depend on the transforThe most frequent answers are as follows: Meanwhile we observe some differences with the second most chosen frequentoption choiceisoption. Among Russian (33%)ofand German (22%)theexperts the second most frequently the following: military mation Ukrainian society, transformation of power (33%) and German (22%) experts the second most frequently chosen option is the following: military contact line Russia in ORDLO. But among experts, the second and third place – Ukrainian political relations will deteriorate and economic cooperinescalations Russia as wellon as the relations between and the West. escalations on the

contact line in ORDLO. But among Ukrainian experts, the second and third place ation will curtail, but there will be no military escalation One German expert assumes there will be a creeping incoramong the most frequently selected options are shared by the following options (with 20% each): among most frequently selected options are shared by the following options (with 20% each): between Russia and Ukraine (22% of will German, 20% of poration ORDLO into Russia, although will cooperation not currentofthe status quo will remain; andMoscow economic between Russia and Ukraine intensify, Ukrainian and 11% of Russian experts); formally recognize it. Another German expert remarks that current status quoof will remain; economic cooperation between Russia and Ukraine will intensify, despite remaining the currentand level of political confrontation and military conflict in ORDLO. – current status quo will conflict remain (22% of German and the development in the and long-term despite

remaining of midthe current level ofperspective political confrontation and military in ORDLO. Proposing own options, one Russian expert notes that further course 5% of Ukrainian experts);of events will depend on will depend on the answer Russian president’s “ability to continue Proposing own answer options, one Russian notes thatwill further course of events will depend on in – there be military theas contact line his policy of the “Russian and undermine any demthe transformation ofworld” Ukrainian society, theexpert transformation of power in escalations Russia as on well relations ORDLO (11% of German, 11% of Russian and 5% ocratic attempts”. the transformation society, theexpert transformation of power in aRussia as well as relations between Russia andof theUkrainian West. One German assumes there will be creeping incorporation ofof Ukrainian experts); between Russia andalthough the West.Moscow One German expert assumes thereit.will be a creeping of ORDLO into Russia,

will not formally recognize Another Germanincorporation expert remarks – military conflict in ORDLOGerman will be frozen thanks to the AORDLO full-scale military escalation between will Russia and into Russia, although Moscow not formally recognize it. Another expert remarks that the development in the mid- and long-term perspective will depend on the Russian president’s Normandy format negotiations, economic cooperation Ukraine is considered as probable in the short-term perthat the development in the midand long-term perspective will depend on the Russian president’s “abilityby to only continue his policy of theand “Russian undermine anyand democratic attempts”. Ukraine Russia will intensify and the politspective one expert (German) in the world” mid- andbetween “ability to continue his policy of the “Russian world” and undermine any democratic attempts”. ical climate of relations will improve (15% of Ukrainian term perspective – by only two experts (one

Ukrainian A full-scale military escalation between Russia and Ukraine is considered as probable in the short-term and 11% of Russian experts). and one German). A full-scale military escalation between Russia and Ukraine is considered as probable in the short-term perspective by only one expert (German) and in the mid-term perspective – by only two experts (one perspective byone onlyGerman). one expert (German) and in the mid-term perspective – by only two experts (one Ukrainian and Ukrainian and one German). Chart 2. Chart 2. How Ukraine-Russia relations develop How will Ukraine-Russia relations develop in the will MID-term (3-5 years) perspective? (one answer) 2. How will relations inChart the MID-term (3-5Ukraine-Russia years) perspective? (onedevelop answer) in the MID-term (3-5 years) perspective? (one answer) Current status quo Current status quo Full-scale military escalation between Russia and Ukraine Full-scale military escalation between Russia and Ukraine Military

escalations on the contact line in ORDLO Military escalations on the contact line in ORDLO Political relations deteriorate, economic cooperation curtails, but no military escalation Political relations deteriorate, economic cooperation curtails, but no military escalation Economic cooperation intensifies, despite current level of politicalcooperation confrontation & military conflict in ORDLO Economic intensifies, despite current level of political confrontation & military conflict in ORDLO Conflict in ORDLO is frozen with help of Normandy format, political relations Conflict ineconomic ORDLO is&frozen with help of improved Normandy format, economic & political relations improved International peacekeeping mission is deployed in ORDLO, economic & political relations improvedin ORDLO, International peacekeeping mission is deployed economic & political relations improved ORDLO is returned to Ukraine, no changes on Crimea, & to political relations improved

ORDLOeconomic is returned Ukraine, no changes on Crimea, economic & political relations improved Military conflict is over, ORDLO & Crimea returned to Ukraine, economic & political relations Military conflict is over, ORDLO & Crimea improved returned to Ukraine, economic & political relations improved Ukrainian experts Ukrainian experts 20% 0% 11%20% 0% 11% 10% 0% 10% 11% 0% 11% 10% 33% 10% 22% 33% 22% 35% 44% 22%35% 44% 22% 20% 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 5% 0% 5%11% 0% 0%11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 0%0% 11% 0%0% 0% 0%0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 20% Russian experts Russian experts 40% 40% German experts German experts 60% 60% 80% 80% 100% 100% As for the long-term (6-15 years) perspective, the 8most widely chosen option can be met only among As the long-term (6-15 years) perspective, the most widely chosen option can be only but among thefor answers of Russian experts − 67% of them believe that ORDLO will be returned to met Ukraine, the the answers of Russian experts − 67% of

them believe that ORDLO will be returned to Ukraine, but the issue of Crimea will remain as it is now, while economic cooperation between Ukraine and Russia will will intensify, but thisinwill no effect on improving relations, and the remaincoexistence. half-frozen. expert believes that thehave long-term perspective Ukraine and Russia canconflict resumewill peaceful One expert assumes the possibility of Russias disintegration in the long-term perspective. Another None of the surveyed experts choseperspective the optionUkraine of returning not can onlyresume ORDLO,peaceful but also Crimea to expert believes that in the long-term and Russia coexistence. RESEARCH RESULTS Ukraine, even in the long-term perspective (up to 15 years). None of the surveyed experts chose the option of returning not only ORDLO, but also Crimea to Looking for grounds for optimism, it can be(up noted that none of the surveyed expert considers as the Ukraine, even in the long-term perspective to 15 years). most

likely the option of a full-scale military escalation between Russia and Ukraine in the long-term Looking for grounds for optimism, it can be noted that none of the surveyed expert considers as the perspective. Chart 3. most likely the option of a full-scale military escalation between Russia and Ukraine in the long-term How will Ukraine-Russia relations develop in the LONG-term (6-15 years) perspective? (one answer) Chart 3. How will Ukraine-Russia relations develop perspective. in the LONG-term (6-15 years) perspective? (one answer) Chart 3. How will Ukraine-Russia relations develop 5% in the LONG-term (6-15 years) (one answer) Current status quo perspective? 0% 22% Currentand status quo Full-scale military escalation between Russia Ukraine 5% 0% 0% 0% 0%22% Full-scaleMilitary militaryescalations escalation on between Russialine andinUkraine the contact ORDLO 0% 5% 0% 11% 0% 11% Political relations deteriorate, economic cooperation Military escalations on the contact line

incurtails, ORDLO but no military escalation 5% 20% 11% 11% 11% 22% Political relations deteriorate, economic cooperation Economic cooperation intensifies, despite currentcurtails, level of but no military escalation political confrontation & military conflict in ORDLO 0% 20% 0%11% 0% 22% Economic cooperation intensifies, despite current format, level of Conflict in ORDLO is frozen with help of Normandy political confrontation & military conflict in ORDLO economic & political relations improved 0% 15% 0% 11% 0% 0% Conflict in ORDLO is frozen with helpisofdeployed Normandy format, International peacekeeping mission in ORDLO, economic economic & & political political relations relations improved improved 15% 0% 11% 0% 0% 11% International missionno is deployed in ORDLO, ORDLO ispeacekeeping returned to Ukraine, changes on Crimea, economic & political relations improved economic & political relations improved 0% 15% 0% 11% 11% 67% ORDLO is to

Ukraine, noreturned changes to onUkraine, Crimea, Military conflict is returned over, ORDLO & Crimea economic & political relations improved economic & political relations improved 15% 0% 0% 11% 0% 67% 0% Military conflict is over, ORDLO & Crimea returned to Ukraine, 0% 0% 20% economic & political relations improved 0% Ukrainian experts Russian experts 0% 20% Ukrainian experts Russian experts 40% 60% 80% 100% German experts 40% 60% 80% 100% German experts 3.2 FACTORS THAT COULD IMPROVE/ DETERIORATE RELATIONS, REDUCE/ INCREASE RISK OF CONFRONTATION Five Ukrainian experts suggest their own answer options. One of them expresses the opinion that in the long-term perspective the level of cooperation between Ukraine and Russia will remain consistently low, and the conflict in the Donbas will have the same intensity as it is now. Another expert believes that the conflict cannot be settled, because it is caused by Russia’s imperial ambitions on the one

hand and Ukraine’s desire to be an independent state on the other. Since Russia is a stronger party, the situation will not be resolved until significant transformations in Russia, which are unlikely in the outlined perspective. Another expert believes that economic cooperation between Ukraine and Russia will intensify, but this will have no effect on improving relations, and the conflict will remain half-frozen. One expert assumes the possibility of Russia’s disintegration in the long-term perspective. Another expert believes that in the longterm perspective Ukraine and Russia can resume peaceful coexistence Experts from all three countries are close in their assessments of more than half of the factors suggested in the questionnaire that could influence the development of Ukraine–Russia relations (answer options were as follows: “improve relations / reduce risk of confrontation”; “deteriorate relations / increase risk of confrontation”; “will not affect

significantly”). The absolute majority of experts from all three countries are in favour of the ability of four factors to improve relations / reduce risk of confrontation between Ukraine and Russia (see Chart 4). It is noteworthy that three of these four options imply political changes in Russia itself, and the fourth option is about the active position of the world community: None of the surveyed experts chose the option of returning not only ORDLO, but also Crimea to Ukraine, even in the long-term perspective (up to 15 years). 1) building strong democratic institutions, ensuring the rule of law and freedom of speech in Russia (positive influence of this option is expected by 100% of Russian, 100% of German and 95% of Ukrainian experts); 2) coming to power in Russia of political forces willing to improve relations with the West (100% of Russian, 100% of German and 75% of Ukrainian experts); Looking for grounds for optimism, it can be noted that none of the surveyed expert

considers as the most likely the option of a full-scale military escalation between Russia and Ukraine in the long-term perspective. 9 FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION – UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? 3) Russia’s abandoning of promoting the concept of the “Russian World” (100% of German, 89% of Russian and 70% of Ukrainian experts); 4) deploying an international peacekeeping mission to the military conflict zone in ORDLO (67% of Russian, 67% of German and 60% of Ukrainian experts). (56% of each) believe that this would help to improve relations / reduce risk of confrontation between Ukraine and Russia. At the same time, only 30% of Ukrainian experts share such a vision, while the same number of Ukrainian experts argue it would only deteriorate relations / increase risk of confrontation with Russia, and 40% believe it would not significantly affect the relations (see Charts 4; 5; 6). On three more factors, a relative majority of experts from all three

countries are in favour of their ability to improve relations / reduce risk of confrontation between Ukraine and Russia (see Chart 4), but at the same time, quite a lot of experts expect that these factors could cause deterioration of relations (see Chart 5): While a relative majority of experts from all three countries are in favour of the positive influence of Ukraine’s possible accession to the EU on relations with Russia, only a majority of Ukrainian experts support a positive vision of Ukraine’s possible accession to NATO. At the same time, their German and Russian colleagues believe it would increase risk of confrontation (see Charts 4; 5). 5) improving EU and U.S relations with Russia, easing sanctions: 78% of Russian, 67% of German and 40% of Ukrainian experts (at the same time, another 35% of Ukrainian and 22% of German experts believe that this factor could deteriorate relations / increase risk of confrontation between Ukraine and Russia); 6) successful economic reforms

in Ukraine, economic growth: 67% of German, 56% of Russian and 45% of Ukrainian experts (while 35% of Ukrainian, 22% of German and 11% of Russian experts believe that this factor could deteriorate relations / increase risk of confrontation between Ukraine and Russia); 7) Ukraine’s accession to the EU: positive impact of this option is expected by 55% of Ukrainian, 44% of Russian and 44% of German experts (while 35% of Ukrainian, 33% of German and only 11% of Russian experts believe that this factor could deteriorate relations / increase risk of confrontation between Ukraine and Russia). Ukraine’s accession to NATO: – – will improve relations / reduce risk of confrontation: 55% of Ukrainian, 33% of German and 22% of Russian experts; – will deteriorate relations / increase risk of confrontation: 67% of German, 44% of Russian and 35% of Ukrainian experts. The opposite is observed on the option of Ukraine’s possible return to non-aligned politics / proclamation of

neutrality: the majority of Russian and German experts believe it could reduce risk of confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, while a relative majority of Ukrainian experts believe it could increase risk of confrontation (see Charts 4; 5). Ukraine’s return to non-aligned politics / proclamation of neutrality: Against this background, it is interesting to note the following points: – – the widespread opinion in Ukraine that a potential improvement of relations of the EU and U.S with Russia would have negative consequences for Ukraine in the context of its relations with Russia is supported by only 35% of surveyed Ukrainian experts, while 40% have the opposite opinion; German (67%) and Russian (56%) experts more than their Ukrainian colleagues (45%) rely on possible positive impact of successful reforms and economic growth in Ukraine; Ukrainian (35%) and German (33%) experts more often than their Russian colleagues (11%) express cautions regarding the confrontational

potential of Ukraine’s possible accession to the EU for Ukraine–Russia relations. – will improve relations / reduce risk of confrontation: 78% of Russian, 56% of German and 25% of Ukrainian experts; – will deteriorate relations / increase risk of confrontation: 40% of Ukrainian, 33% of German, 0 Russian experts. It is also worth mentioning that the majority of the surveyed experts from all three countries believe that expanding of the Normandy format by including the United States and other countries makes little sense: 78% of Russian, 78% of German and 50% of Ukrainian experts believe this would not have significant impact (see Chart 6). Despite the widespread opinion in Ukraine on the feasibility of strengthening sanctions against Russia, only 33% of German, 25% of Ukrainian and 11% of Russian experts believe that the imposition of new, tougher EU and U.S economic sanctions against Russia could reduce risk of confrontation between Ukraine and Russia. Along with that, 35%

of Ukrainian, 22% of German and 22% of Rus- It is also worth mentioning that reflections of the experts from different countries on building strong democratic institutions, ensuring the rule of law and freedom of speech in Ukraine are similar to the factor of economic growth in Ukraine. The majority of Russian and German experts 10 RESEARCH RESULTS sian experts expect that such a step would increase risk of confrontation. At the same time, a relative majority of the surveyed experts from all three countries (67% of Russian, 44% of German, 40% of Ukrainian experts) believe that making sanctions tougher would not have significant impact (see Charts 4; 5; 6). It is also worth mentioning the opposite expectations of German and Ukrainian experts on the one hand, and Russian experts on the other, regarding the possible transit of power in Russia to Vladimir Putin’s successor within the current ruling system: 67% of German and 60% of Ukrainian experts believe this would not have a

significant impact on Ukraine–Russia relations (see Chart 6), while 67% of Russian experts expect improvement of relations / reduction of the confrontation risk (see Chart 4). One more fairly common in Ukraine vision that lacks support among the surveyed experts is about the course to minimizing bilateral trade between Ukraine and Russia. Only 11% of German and 10% of Ukrainian experts believe that this would help to reduce risk of confrontation (none of the Russian experts supported this option). Along with that, 44% of Russian, 33% of German and 15% of Ukrainian experts shared the opinion that such course would increase risk of confrontation. And the majority of experts from all three countries (70% of Ukrainian, 56% of Russian and 56% of German) believe that minimizing bilateral trade between Ukraine and Russia would not have a significant impact on their relations (see Charts 4; 5; 6). Among experts’ own suggestions of factors / conditions which could reduce risk of

full-scale military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, one option (with minor variations) was mentioned by the experts of all three states, namely: – increasing Ukraine’s defence capabilities, including through Western assistance. Ukrainian and German experts also suggested: – It is interesting to mention that the surveyed Ukrainian experts presume worse consequences of the potential deep economic crisis in Russia than their Russian and German colleagues: 55% of Ukrainian, 44% of Russian and 22% of German experts believe that such a crisis in Russia would increase risk of its confrontation with Ukraine (see Chart 5). Along with that, 44% of Russian, 44% of German and 30% of Ukrainian experts presume reduction of confrontation risk due to the impact of this factor (see Chart 4). – – – At the same time, the absolute majority of experts from all three countries presume negative consequences in case of a potential deep economic crisis in Ukraine: 67% of Russian, 67% of

German and 65% of Ukrainian experts believe that such a crisis in Ukraine would increase confrontational risk in its relations with Russia (see Chart 5). Therefore, strengthening the economy is important for Ukraine including in the context of enhancing its ­security. strengthening bilateral military cooperation of Ukraine with other countries, in particular, with the United States, Great Britain, Turkey, Poland, and ­Romania; increasing Western investment in Ukraine’s economy (one German expert also suggested automatic granting permanent residency permissions to EU, U.S and other Western citizens moving to Ukraine); increasing the price of military escalation for Russia (including through sanctions); possible crisis in Russia (several Ukrainian experts wrote about the resource crisis or possible collapse of Russia, while one German expert mentioned the possible “internal chaos” in Russia). Ukrainian and Russian experts expressed similar opinions on: – The experts’

assessments of the generational change factor impact also deserve interest. The absolute majority of the surveyed experts from all three countries (70% of Ukrainian, 67% of Russian and 67% of German) believe that natural generational change in Ukrainian society will not have a significant impact on Ukraine–Russia relations (see Chart 6). However, the experts are divided in their assessment of the question about natural generation change in Russian society: 67% of Russian experts expect improvement of relations / reduction of risk of confrontation between Ukraine and Russia (see Chart 4). On contrast, 50% of Ukrainian experts do not expect this factor to have a significant impact on bilateral relations (see Chart 6). The opinions of German experts are equally divided among all three options: will improve, will deteriorate, and will not significantly affect the relations (see Charts 4; 5; 6). the need to provide Ukraine with international security guarantees in the form of bilateral

or multilateral agreements. Ukrainian experts also named the following options that could reduce risk of a full-scale military conflict between Ukraine and Russia: – – – – – – – – 11 increasing the resilience of Ukrainian society to hybrid threats; domestic political stabilization in Ukraine; convincing demonstration by Ukraine and partners of their readiness to resist; deployment of European and American troops and weapons on the territory of Ukraine (one expert proposed deployment of U.S nuclear weapons); increasing the efficiency of EU institutions; an effective strategy of the West to deter Russia; professional pragmatic policy; finding an interim compromise through negotiations. FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION – UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? Russian experts suggested the following own options: – – – – successful implementation of the Association Agreement and start of Ukraine’s accession to the EU procedure; Ukraine’s

abandoning the NATO membership course; approval and implementation of new measures of de-escalation and implementation of the Minsk agreements; – – restoration of economic ties between the territories controlled by Kyiv and ORDLO, as well as between Ukraine and Russia; the political will of the high authorities of both countries; unreadiness of Russia and Ukraine to afford a full-scale military conflict in terms of concomitant losses, as well as their unreadiness to invest in the reconstruction of the Donbas. 15 Chart 4. Chart 4. Expertsrelations who believe these factors could Experts who believe these factors could IMPROVE Ukraine–Russia / reduce risk of confrontation, % 15 IMPROVE Chart Ukraine−Russia / reduce of confrontation, % 4. Experts relations who believe theserisk factors could IMPROVE Ukraine−Russia relations / reduce risk of confrontation, % 40% Generation change in Russian society Generation in Russian society Transit of power in Russia to Putinschange

successor within system Transit of power inwilling Russiato toimprove Putins successor within system New RU authorities relations with the West 33% 40% 5% 22%33% 5% 22% 40% Abandoning of with the "Russian World"sanctions concept Improving EU &promotion US relations Russia, easing New EU &growth US sanctions on with Russian leaders &current relatedregime circles Economic in Russia maintaining EconomicReduction growth in of Russia withfrom maintaining currentexports regime income Russian energy Reduction of incomeDeep fromeconomic Russian energy crisis inexports Russia Deep economic crisis insociety Russia Generational change in Ukrainian Generational in Ukrainian society Minimizing Russian factor inchange domestic policy in Ukraine Minimizing Russian factor in domestic policy in Ukraine Ukraine Strong democratic institutions, the rule of law in Strong Successful democraticreforms institutions, the rulegrowth of law in Ukraine & economic in Ukraine

Successful reformsDeep & economic growth in Ukraine economic crisis in Ukraine Deep economic crisis and in Ukraine Building up bilateral trade between Ukraine Russia Building up bilateral trade between Ukraine and and Russia Russia Minimizing bilateral trade between Ukraine Minimizing bilateral trade between Ukraine and Russia Minimizing Ukraines dependence on Russian energy supplies Minimizing Ukraine’s Ukraines return dependence on Russian energyneutrality supplies to non-aligned politics, Ukraine’s return to non-aligned politics, neutrality Ukraines accession to the EU Ukraines EU Ukrainesaccession accessionto tothe NATO accessionAlly to status NATO Obtaining by Ukraine of the US Ukraines Major Non-NATO Obtaining by Ukraine of Expansion the US Major Non-NATO Allyformat status of the Normandy Expansion of conflict the Normandy International peacekeeping mission in zone in format ORDLO International peacekeeping mission in conflict zone in ORDLO 75% 67% 70% Strong

democratic institutions, the rule World" of law inconcept Russia Abandoning promotion of the "Russian EU on & US economic sanctions on Russia New EUNew & UStougher sanctions Russian leaders & related circles 67% 67% 75% New RUStrong authorities willinginstitutions, to improve the relations West democratic rule ofwith law the in Russia Improving EU & US EU relations with Russia, easing on sanctions New tougher & US economic sanctions Russia 67% 100% 100% 95% 100% 100% 100% 95% 89%100% 100% 100% 70% 78%89%100% 67% 25% 40% 78% 67% 33% 25% 30% 11%22% 33% 33% 30% 10%22% 0% 33% 0% 10% 0% 22% 35% 0% 33% 35% 30% 22% 44% 33%44% 30% 10% 44% 11% 44% 22% 10% 55% 11% 22% 44% 55% 30% 22% 44% 56% 56% 30% 45% 56% 56%67% 45% 20% 56% 22% 67% 11% 20% 35% 22% 67% 11% 67% 10% 35% 67% 0% 67% 11% 10% 45% 0% 0% 11%22% 45% 0% 25% 78% 22% 56% 25% 55% 78% 44% 56% 44% 55% 44%55% 22% 33%44% 55% 50% 22% 22%33% 22% 25% 50% 11%22% 22% 22% 25% 60% 11% 67% 22% 67% 60% 67% 0% 10%

20% 30% 67% 40% 11% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Ukrainian experts 0% 10% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Russian experts20% 30% German experts Ukrainian experts Russian experts 12 German experts RESEARCH RESULTS German experts suggested the following own options: – – – – re-definition of Russian interest as a result of changes in Russia and growing stability in Ukraine; substantive change in Russian policy towards Ukraine and the corresponding conflict transformation; policy change in Russia away from the “Russian world” towards the European integration; improving diplomatic relations between Ukraine and – – Russia and increasing exchange of contacts at the level of societies; “more awareness in Ukraine that its military is not a match for Russia”; deterioration of relations between Russia and China. Suggesting their own options of factors / conditions that could increase risk of a full-scale military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, experts from all

three countries 16 Chart 5. Chart 5. Experts who believe these factors could Experts who believe these factors could DETERIORATE Ukraine–Russia relations / increase risk of confrontation, % 15 DETERIORATE Ukraine−Russia relations / increase risk of confrontation, % Chart 4. Experts who believe these factors could 5% / reduce risk of confrontation, % IMPROVE Ukraine−Russia relations Generation change in Russian society 11% 33% 35% 40% 33% Transit of power in Russia to Putinschange successor within system Generation in Russian society 11% 67% 11% 0% 5% Transit of power in Russiatotoimprove Putins successor within New RU authorities willing relations with thesystem West 67% 0% 0% 22% 75% 0% New RU authorities willing to improvethe relations West 0% 100% Strong democratic institutions, rule ofwith law the in Russia 100% 0% 95% 5% Strong democratic institutions, the ruleWorld" of law in Russia 0% 100% Abandoning promotion of the "Russian concept 100% 0% 70% 35%

Abandoning ofwith the "Russian World" concept 0% 89% Improving EU & promotion US relations Russia, easing sanctions 100% 22% 40% 35% Improving EU & USEU relations with Russia, easing on sanctions 78% New tougher & US economic sanctions Russia 22% 67% 22% 25% EUon & US economic sanctions on circles Russia 11%22% New EU New & UStougher sanctions Russian leaders & related 22%33% 30% 80% New EU &growth US sanctions onwith Russian leaders &current relatedregime circles 22%33% Economic in Russia maintaining 33% 33% 10% 30% Economic growth inofRussia with maintaining currentexports regime 0% Reduction income from Russian energy 44% 0% 22% 35% 55% Reduction of income fromeconomic Russian energy 22% Deep crisis inexports Russia 44% 22%33% 30% 15% Deep economic crisis insociety Russia Generational change in Ukrainian 22% 44% 44% 11% 10% 5% Generational change in Ukrainian society 11% Minimizing Russian factor in domestic policy in Ukraine 11%22% 33% 55%

30% Minimizing Russian factor in domestic policy in Ukraine 22% Strong democratic institutions, the rule of law in Ukraine 11% 44% 22% 30% 35% 56% StrongSuccessful democratic institutions, the rulegrowth of law in in Ukraine Ukraine reforms & economic 11% 56% 22% 45% 65% Successful reforms & economic in Ukraine Ukraine 56%67% Deep economicgrowth crisis in 67% 67% 20% 10%22% Deep economic crisisand in Ukraine Building up bilateral trade between Ukraine Russia 0% 11%22% 35% 15% Building upbilateral bilateraltrade tradebetween betweenUkraine Ukraine and and Russia Russia 67% Minimizing 44% 67% 33% 10% Minimizing bilateral trade between Ukraine and Russia 0% 20% Minimizing Ukraines dependence on Russian energy supplies 11% 33% 45% 40% Minimizing Ukraines dependence on Russian energy supplies 0% Ukraine’s return to non-aligned politics, neutrality 0% 22% 33% 25% 35% Ukraine’s return to non-aligned politics, neutrality 78% Ukraines accession to the EU 11% 56% 33% 55% 35%44%

Ukraines accession to the EU Ukraines accession to NATO 44% 67% 55% Ukraines accession to NATO 22% 40% Obtaining by Ukraine of the US Major Non-NATO Ally status 33% 44% 50% Obtaining by Ukraine of the US Major Non-NATO Ally status 22% 20% Expansion of the Normandy format 0% 22% 0% 25% Expansion of the Normandy format 11% 10% International peacekeeping mission in conflict zone in ORDLO 11%22% 0% 60% International peacekeeping mission in conflict zone in ORDLO 67% 67% 40% 50% 60% 0% 10% 20% 30% 70% 80% 90% 100% Ukrainian experts 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Russian experts German experts Ukrainian experts Russian experts 13 German experts FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION – UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? mentioned the following: – – Ukrainian and German experts also named among the potential risk increasing factors the following: weakening the unity of the West and its support for Ukraine; severe domestic political crisis in Russia;

establishment of a harsh dictatorship by Vladimir Putin or his more radical successor. – – significant deterioration of Russia’s relations with the United States and the West in general; launch of the Nord Stream 2 and possible termination of gas transit through the territory of Ukraine. 17 17 Chart 6. Experts who believe these factors Chart 6. Chart 6. Experts who believe these factors Experts who believe these factors WOULD NOTSIGNIFICANTLY SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT Ukraine–Russia relations, % WOULD NOT AFFECT Ukraine−Russia relations, % WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT Ukraine−Russia relations, % Generation change in Russian society Generation change in Russian society Transit of power in Russia to Putins successor within system Transit of power in Russia to Putins successor within system New RU authorities willing to improve relations with the West New RU authorities willing to improve relations with the West Strong democratic institutions, the rule of law in Russia

Strong democratic institutions, the rule of law in Russia Abandoning promotion of the "Russian World" concept Abandoning promotion of the "Russian World" concept Improving EU & US relations with Russia, easing sanctions Improving EU & US relations with Russia, easing sanctions New tougher EU & US economic sanctions on Russia New tougher EU & US economic sanctions on Russia New EU & US sanctions on Russian leaders & related circles New EU & US sanctions on Russian leaders & related circles Economic growth in Russia with maintaining current regime Economic growth in Russia with maintaining current regime Reduction of income from Russian energy exports Reduction of income from Russian energy exports Deep economic crisis in Russia Deep economic crisis in Russia Generational change in Ukrainian society Generational change in Ukrainian society Minimizing Russian factor in domestic policy in Ukraine Minimizing Russian factor in domestic

policy in Ukraine Strong democratic institutions, the rule of law in Ukraine Strong democratic institutions, the rule of law in Ukraine Successful reforms & economic growth in Ukraine Successful reforms & economic growth in Ukraine Deep economic crisis in Ukraine Deep economic crisis in Ukraine Building up bilateral trade between Ukraine and Russia Building up bilateral trade between Ukraine and Russia Minimizing bilateral trade between Ukraine and Russia Minimizing bilateral trade between Ukraine and Russia Minimizing Ukraines dependence on Russian energy supplies Minimizing Ukraines dependence on Russian energy supplies Ukraine’s return to non-aligned politics, neutrality Ukraine’s return to non-aligned politics, neutrality Ukraines accession to the EU Ukraines accession to the EU Ukraines accession to NATO Ukraines accession to NATO Obtaining by Ukraine of the US Major Non-NATO Ally status Obtaining by Ukraine of the US Major Non-NATO Ally status Expansion of the

Normandy format Expansion of the Normandy format International peacekeeping mission in conflict zone in ORDLO International peacekeeping mission in conflict zone in ORDLO Ukrainian experts Ukrainian experts 50% 22% 50% 22%33% 33% 60% 22% 60%67% 22% 67% 25% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 5% 0% 0% 0% 25% 11% 25% 0% 11% 0% 20% 22% 11%20% 22% 11% 40% 67% 40% 44% 67% 44% 45% 45%56% 44% 56% 44% 10% 67% 10% 67% 67% 67% 35% 33% 35%44% 33% 44% 15% 11% 15% 11%22% 22% 70% 67% 70% 67% 67% 67% 40% 67% 22% 40% 67% 22% 40% 33% 40% 22%33% 22% 20% 33% 11%20% 33% 11% 15% 11% 15% 11%22% 22% 55% 33% 55% 11% 33% 11% 70% 56% 70% 56% 56% 56% 30% 89% 30% 44% 89% 30% 44% 22% 30% 0% 22% 0% 5% 5% 22%33% 33% 5% 22% 22% 5% 0% 22% 0% 5% 33% 5% 33% 33% 33% 50% 78% 50% 78% 78% 78% 25% 22% 25% 22%33% 33% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Russian experts German experts Russian experts German experts 14 Among experts’ own suggestions of factors / conditions which could

REDUCE RISK of full-scale military Among experts’ own suggestions of factors / conditions which could REDUCE RISK of full-scale military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, one option (with minor variations) was mentioned by the experts RESEARCH RESULTS Russian and German experts named as a potential risk: – – a possible attempt of Kyiv to settle the issue of ORDLO or Crimea through a military operation. Other common challenges most often indicated by the experts: Ukrainian experts most often mentioned the risks associated with a possible deterioration of the domestic political situation in the country: – – – – – – – – weakening of public institutions in Ukraine; growing internal contradictions and conflict-generating factors in Ukraine; destabilization of the situation in Ukraine; loss of Kyiv’s influence on the situation in the regions; demoralization of Ukrainian society and loss of the will to resist; further expansion of the “Russian world”

in Ukraine; “pseudo-patriotic competitions”. – – – low level of political culture of the people: 44% of Russian, 40% of Ukrainian and 11% of German experts; climate change, environmental problems: 44% of German and 40% of Ukrainian experts (at the same time, none of the Russian experts marked this challenge); emergence of new dividing lines in Europe: 44% of German, 33% of Russian and 5% of Ukrainian experts; brain drains: 44% of German, 22% of Russian and 15% of Ukrainian experts. One Russian expert suggested own answer option – a common for the post-Soviet area economic and technological degradation, as well as a weak capacity for self-modernization. One German expert suggested that both Ukraine and Russia lack a development model that aims at stability, security and prosperity of the people. Among other factors that could increase risk of a full-scale military conflict, Ukrainian experts also mentioned the following: – pandemics: 56% of German, 33% of Russian and

25% of Ukrainian experts. rapprochement of Ukraine with the EU and/or NATO without accession and without building proper security infrastructure; “great agreement” between the U.S, the EU and Russia; attempts of appeasement in response to aggression, which will stimulate further escalation. Russian experts named the following potential risk factors: In responses to the question “In what areas does cooperation between Ukraine and Russia have more chances to be equally beneficial to both sides?” (respondents could choose up to three answers), it is noticeable that in the conditions of the ongoing war, Ukrainian experts are much less optimistic about the prospects of mutually beneficial cooperation than their Russian and German colleagues. – – The most frequent choices of the surveyed experts are the following areas (see Chart 8): – – – – closing Russia in a geopolitical ghetto; recognition by Russia of the independence of the self-proclaimed “republics” in

ORDLO; maintaining an unstable armistice without the prospect of a mutually acceptable political settlement; attempts to settle the conflict on the initiatives of NATO or the United States. 1) economics: 67% of Russian, 44% of German and 20% of Ukrainian experts; 2) education and science: 56% of Russian, 56% of German, but only 10% of Ukrainian experts (at the same time, significantly more Ukrainian experts (25%) consider this area to be one of the most jeopardizing for bilateral relations – see Chart 9); 3) climate change and environmental protection: 56% of German, 33% of Russian and 25% of Ukrainian experts; 4) healthcare: 44% of German, 11% of Russian and 10% of Ukrainian experts; 5) fight against crime: 22% of German, 22% of Russian and 15% of Ukrainian experts. German experts named the following risk increasing options: – – – unforeseen incident on the contact line; shortage of fresh water reserves in Crimea; poor governance, increasing corruption and informal rules,

political instability in Ukraine. 3.3 COMMON CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL AREAS OF COOPERATION It is noteworthy that none of the surveyed Ukrainian experts sees prospects for mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia in the areas of culture; information sphere and mass media; and international policy. At the same time, none of the Russian experts considers energy as a potential mutually beneficial area. Among the most urgent common challenges for Ukraine and Russia (respondents could choose up to three options), two options received the greatest support from the surveyed experts (see Chart 7): – deepening economic stratification of societies: 89% of Russian, 45% of Ukrainian and 44% of German experts; In their own answer options, two Ukrainian experts note that mutually beneficial cooperation is impossible 15 FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION – UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? 21 Chart 7. The most urgent common challenges for The Ukraine and Russia (onecommon

to three answers) Chart 7. most urgent challenges (one to three answers) 45% 44% Deepening economic stratification of societies Brain drains Low level of political culture of the people Growing populism and radicalism in societies Uncontrolled regional migration flows Climate change, environmental problems 15% 22% Emergence of new dividing lines in Europe Increasing global competition of the US and China No common challenges for Ukraine and Russia 44% 30% 22% 0% 0% 0% 40% 44% 0% 25% 33% Pandemics Regional conflicts 89% 40% 44% 11% 0% for Ukraine and Russia 56% 5% 11% 11% 5% 33% 44% 5% 0% 0% 22 10% 0% 0% Ukrainian expert believes that cooperation can on the of de-occupation and 0% take place 20% 40% issues60% 80% 100% compensation for damages. One Russian expert suggests that cooperation on various issues that are experts Russian expertsbeneficial. GermanOne experts important for a wide range ofUkrainian countries could be mutually German expert believes that in

the event of a change in Russian policy, cooperation in all of the mentioned areas could be mutually beneficial. Another German expert stresses that in the current circumstances, Russia uses its economic influence to corrupt the political process in Ukraine. In responses to the question “In what areas does cooperation between Ukraine and Russia have more chances to be equally toareas both sides?” (respondents choose to three Chart 8. Chartbeneficial 8. In what cooperation betweencould Ukraine and up Russia haveanswers), chances it is In what areas cooperation between Ukraine and Russia have chances to be equally beneficial to both sides? (one toless threeoptimistic answers) noticeable that in the conditions of the ongoing war, Ukrainian experts are much about to be equally beneficial to both sides? (one to three answers) the prospects of mutually beneficial cooperation than their Russian and German colleagues. Education & science 10% 56% 56% The most frequent choices of the

surveyed experts are the following areas (see Chart 8): 0% 1) economics: 67% of Russian, 44% ofCulture German11% and 33% 20% of Ukrainian experts; 0% 0% sphereof & mass media 56% 11% 2) education andInformation science: 56% Russian, of German, but only 10% of Ukrainian experts (at 11% the same time, significantly more Ukrainian experts (25%) consider this area to be one of the 25% Climate & environmental protection 33% most jeopardizing for bilateral relations – see Chart 9);56% 10% Healthcare 11% 56% of German, 33% of Russian and 25% of 3) climate change and environmental protection: 44% 20% Ukrainian experts; Economics 67% 44% 4) healthcare: 44% of German, 11% of Russian10% and 10% of Ukrainian experts; Energy 0% 22% 5) fight against crime: 22% of German, 22% of0%Russian and 15% of Ukrainian experts. International policy 22% 11% It is noteworthy that none of the surveyed Ukrainian experts sees prospects for mutually beneficial 10% Regional security information 33%

sphere and mass media; and international cooperation with Russia in the areas of culture; 11% policy. At the same time, none of the Russian experts considers energy as a potential mutually 15% Fight against crime 22% 22% beneficial area. 10% terrorism experts 11% In their own answer options, Countering two Ukrainian note that mutually beneficial cooperation is 11% impossible now, given that Russia’s actions are aimed at depriving Ukraine60%of its subjectivity and 0% 20% 40% 80% 100% absorbing the country. Two more Ukrainian experts express the opinion that mutually beneficial experts but German experts Ukrainian cooperation between Ukraine and experts Russia is Russian impossible, without explaining the reasons. One Answering the question “Interaction in which areas most of all jeopardizes bilateral relations the question which areas most beneficial of all jeopardizes bilateral relations now, Answering given that Russia’s actions “Interaction are aimed atindepriving mutually

cooperation between Ukraine and between Ukraine and Russia?” (respondents could choose up to three answers), the experts most Ukraine of its subjectivity and absorbing the country. Russia is impossible, but without explaining the reasons. often mention the following areas (see Chart 9): Two more Ukrainian experts express the opinion that One Ukrainian expert believes that cooperation can take  information sphere and mass media: 67%16 of German, 60% of Ukrainian and 56% of Russian experts (this is the only area that the absolute majority of the surveyed experts consider jeopardizing for bilateral relations); RESEARCH RESULTS 23 Chart 9. Interaction in which areas most of all jeopardizes bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia? (one to three answers) Chart 9. Interaction in which areas most of all jeopardizes bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia? (one to three answers) Chart 9. Interaction in which areas most of all jeopardizes bilateral relations 25%

Education & science 0% between Ukraine and 11%Russia? (one to three answers) Culture Education & science Information sphere & mass media Culture Climate & environmental protection Information sphere & mass media Healthcare Climate & environmental protection Economics Healthcare Energy Economics International policy Energy Regional security International policy Fight against crime Regional security Countering terrorism Fight against crime Countering terrorism Ukrainian experts 40% 0% 25% 0% 33% 11% 60% 40% 56% 0% 67% 33% 0% 60% 0% 56% 0% 67% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 0% 22% 0% 50% 5% 33% 0% 44% 22% 25% 50% 78% 33% 56% 44% 50% 25% 44% 78% 56% 56% 0% 50% 0% 44% 0% 56% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 40% 0% 0% Russian experts 0% 20% German experts 40% 23 60% 80% 100% 60% 80% 100% experts Russian experts German experts areas of interaction to be It should be noted that none Ukrainian of the surveyed experts considers the following among the most jeopardizing for

bilateral relations (see Chart 9): It should be noted that none of the surveyed experts considers the following areas of interaction to be  climate change and environmental protection; among the most bilateral relations Chart place on the issues of jeopardizing de-occupationfor and compensation for (see the most9): jeopardizing for bilateral relations (see Chart 9):  One healthcare; damages. Russian expert suggests that cooperation – climate change and environmental protection;  climate change and environmental protection; – healthcare; on various issues that are important for a wide range  fight against crime; beneficial. One German – fight against crime; of countries could be mutually  healthcare; – countering terrorism. expert believes that in terrorism. the event of a change in Russian countering fight against policy, cooperation in all crime; of the mentioned areas could be In addition, onlyAnother 22% ofGerman German and stresses 5% of Ukrainian

experts only (and 22% noneofofGerman the Russian experts) In addition, and 5% of Ukrainian mutually expert that  beneficial. countering terrorism. thecircumstances, economics to be among jeopardizing area of none interaction bilateral relations. experts (and of thefor Russian experts) consider the in consider the current Russia usesthe its most economic In addition, only 22% of German and 5% of Ukrainian expertsto(and none ofthe themost Russian experts) economics be among jeopardizing influence to corrupt process in Ukraine. To note: amongthe thepolitical potential mutually beneficial areas of cooperation, economics is the first mostarea of consider the economics to be among the most jeopardizing area for of interaction for bilateral relations. interaction bilateral relations. frequent choice of the surveyed experts, climate change and the environmental protection − the third, Answering the question “Interaction in which areas most To note: among potential mutually beneficial

areas ofmost cooperation, the first most healthcare − the the fourth, and fight against crime − the fifth frequent economics choices (seeisChart 8). Thus, To note: among the potential mutually beneficial areas of all jeopardizes bilateral relations between Ukraine and frequent choice ofbalance the surveyed experts, climate change and the environmental protection − the third, according to the of positive and negative assessments, these areas can be considered as of cooperation, economics is the first most frequent Russia?” (respondents could choose up to three answers), the healthcare − the fourth, and fight against crime − the fifth most frequent choices (see Chart 8). Thus, potentially the most promising and least risky for bilateral interaction, if the appropriate choice of the surveyed experts, climate change and the experts most often mention the following areas (see Chart 9): according to the these areas can considered as – the preconditions are balance in place. of

positive and negative assessments, environmental protection – thebethird, healthcare the most promising and ofleast risky for bilateral interaction, if –the appropriate – potentially informationtosphere and mass media: 67% fourth, and fight crime the information fifth most frequent According the experts’ assessments, theGerman, most problematic area of against interaction is the preconditions are inand place. 60% of Ukrainian 56% of Russian experts (this choices (see Chart 8). Thus, according to the sphere and mass media that is the first in terms of negative potential for Ukraine−Russia relations (seebalance is the only area that the absolute majority of the of positive and negative assessments, these areas can According to at the assessments, most problematicmutually area of beneficial interaction is the information Chart 9), and theexperts’ same time, the last in the the list of potentially areas of cooperation surveyed experts consider jeopardizing for bilateral be

considered as potentially the most promising and sphere and8). mass media that is the first in terms of negative potential for Ukraine−Russia relations (see (see Chart relations); least risky for bilateral interaction, if the appropriate Chart 9), and at the same time, the last in the list of potentially mutually beneficial areas of cooperation – international policy: 78% of Russian, 56% of German preconditions are in place. (see Chart 8). and 25% of Ukrainian experts; – regional security: 56% of German, 50% of Ukrainian According to the experts’ assessments, the most and 44% of Russian experts; area of interaction is the information sphere Is Russia ready to perceive Ukraineproblematic as an independent country? – energy: 50% of Ukrainian, 44% of German and 33% and mass media that is the first in terms of negative of Russian experts. for Ukraine–Russia relations (see Chart 9), and Is Russia ready to perceive Ukrainepotential as an independent country? at the same time,

the last in the list of potentially mutually It should be noted that none of the surveyed experts beneficial areas of cooperation (see Chart 8). considers the following areas of interaction to be among 17 FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION – UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? 3.4 IS RUSSIA READY TO PERCEIVE UKRAINE AS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY? zens of Russia and other countries in the region is much more often chosen by German experts (78%) than by their Ukrainian (45%) and Russian (33%) colleagues. On the other hand, Russian experts (56%) much more often than Ukrainian (25%) and German (22%) colleagues indicate the weakness of Ukraine’s economy as a factor hindering perception of Ukraine as an independent state. Among the answers to the question “What factors prevent the Russian high-ranking officials from perceiving Ukraine as an independent country that has the right to its own domestic and foreign policy?” (respondents could choose up to three answers), one

option is supported by the absolute majority of the experts from all three countries (see Chart 10): – It is also noteworthy that the factor of Ukraine’s dependence on EU and U.S support (often mentioned by Russian politicians and propaganda media), as well as presence of pro-Russian forces in the elected public bodies of Ukraine – are the least frequent choices of the experts from all three countries (see Chart 10). imperial ideology / belief of the Russian leadership in the concepts of the “Russian world” and the “triune Russian people”: 67% of Russian, 65% of Ukrainian and 56% of German experts. Suggesting own answer options, one Ukrainian expert mentions that the problem lies not in the Russian authorities’ perception of Ukraine as an independent state, but in perception of Ukraine as a threat. Another Ukrainian expert notes “the existential rejection” of Ukraine and the West by the Russian high-ranking officials. One Russian expert considers that the Russian

authorities, in principle, do not perceive Ukraine as an independent state, believing that Ukraine always depends either on Moscow, or on Washington, Brussels or Berlin. Another Russian expert considers that current stance of the Russian authorities on Ukraine is influenced by the corresponding request of the older generation of Russians. One German expert considers that perception of Ukraine by Russian high-ranking officials is influenced by the close historical ties between the people of two countries since the times of Rus, as well as by Russia’s security concerns. Other most frequent answers are the following: – – – – concerns of the current Russian leadership that the potential success of a democratic Ukraine will become an attractive example for the citizens of Russia and other countries, which Moscow considers its zone of privileged interests: 78% of German, 45% of Ukrainian and 33% of Russian experts; conviction of the Russian leadership that Ukraine’s

independence poses a threat to Russia’s security: 56% of German, 45% of Ukrainian and 22% of Russian experts; ambition to include Ukraine in Russian integration projects, including the economic ones: 44% of German, 33% of Russian and 30% of Ukrainian experts; weakness of Ukrainian economy: 56% of Russian, 25% of Ukrainian and 22% of German experts. In response to the question “What factors could contribute to shaping among the majority of Russian citizens of the perception of Ukrainians as a separate nation that has It is interesting to mention that the option of potential success of a democratic Ukraine as an example for the citi- 25 Chart 10. Chart 10. What factors prevent the Russian high-ranking officials from What factors prevent the Russian high-ranking officials from perceiving Ukraine as an independent country (one to three answers) perceiving Ukraine as an independent country (one to three answers) 25% Weakness of Ukrainian economy 30% 33% 33% Weakness of Ukrainian

political institutions 5% Ukraines dependence on EU and US support Presence of pro-Russian forces in the elected public bodies of Ukraine 56% 22% 0% 22% 15% 0% 11% Conviction of Russian leaders that Ukraine’s independence poses a threat to Russias security 45% 22% 56% 30% 33% 44% Ambition to include Ukraine in Russian integration projects Potential success of Ukraine may become an example for the citizens of Russia and other countries 33% 45% 0% Ukrainian experts 78% 65% 67% 56% Imperial ideology, belief of Russian leaders in "Russian world" and "triune Russian people" concepts 20% Russian experts 40% 60% 80% 100% German experts 18 In response to the question “What factors could contribute to shaping among the majority of Russian citizens of the perception of Ukrainians as a separate nation that has the right to an independent RESEARCH RESULTS 26 Chart 11. Factors shaping among Russian citizens the perception of Ukrainians Chart 11.

Factors shaping among Russian citizens perception of Ukrainians a separate with right tostate an independent (one to three answers) as athe separate nation with as right to annation independent (one to state three answers) Building strong economy, achieving high standard of living in Ukraine 45% Building strong democratic institutions, ensuring the rule of law in Ukraine 40% Significant strengthening of Ukrainian Armed Forces and special services 11% 22% Ukraines accession to the EU and / or NATO 67% 78% 35% 33% 33% 50% 25% 33% 44% Abandoning anti-Ukrainian narratives by Russian leaders Abandoning anti-Ukrainian propaganda in Russian media; information campaign to overcome imperial stereotypes 20% 33% 56% 5% 0% 0% Nothing will help 0% Ukrainian experts 78% 67% 20% Russian experts 40% 60% 80% 100% German experts the right to an independent country with its own domes3.5 MODELS OF COEXISTENCE tic and foreign policy?” (respondents could choose up to None of the

options for answering the question “Relations three answers): Models of coexistence between which countries could be considered as the op– Ukrainian experts (50%) give preference to the option timal model for coexistence of Ukraine and Russia?” (reNone of the options the question between which be their own) of Ukraine’s accession to theforEUanswering and/or NATO, while “Relations spondents could choose onecountries option orcould suggest considered as the experts optimal(33% modeloffor coexistence Russia?” (respondents could for Russian and German each) this op- of Ukraine got the and support of more than a third ofchoose the surveyed exone option their own) got the support of perts more from than aUkraine, third of Russia the surveyed expertsAnd fromamong the tion is only in thirdortosuggest fifth places; or Germany. Ukraine, Russia or Germany. Andexperts among (78%) the experts options, a single one was repeated – the most frequent choice of Russian is own experts’

own not options, not a single one wasmore repeated more than twice. economy, At the same time, onaaverage, experts more than options chose following building a strong achieving high standard thanoften twice. Atother the same time, onthe average, experts more models of coexistence (see Chart of living in Ukraine; this option is also12): supported by often than other options chose the following models of 67% of German and only 45% of of Ukrainian coexistence Chart 12):  Finland – USSR (33% Russian,experts; 20% of Ukrainian and 11%(see of German experts); – German experts prefer the option of building strong Poland – Germany (22% the of German, 15%inof Ukrainian and–11% of(33% Russian – Finland USSR of experts); Russian, 20% of Ukrainian and democratic institutions and ensuring rule of law 11% of German experts); Ukraine (78%); the same option is supported by 67%  Canada – USA (22% of Russian, 11% of German and 10% of Ukrainian experts); – Poland – Germany (22% of

German, 15% of Ukrainian of Russian and only 40% of Ukrainian experts (see  Croatia – Serbia (22% of German, 15% of Ukrainian and 0 Russian experts). and 11% of Russian experts); Chart 11). Ukrainian experts chose the following models: Finland–USSR (20%), Poland–Germany (15%), Croatia– – Canada – USA (22% of Russian, 11% of German and Serbia (15%), FRG–USSR Canada–USA (10%), Japan–Russia (5%). Inexperts); addition, two Ukrainian 10% of Ukrainian Thus, Russian and German experts(15%), rely more than their in their own answer options proposed Poland−Russia as the op�mal(22% model; expert15% named – Croatia – Serbia of one German, of Ukrainian Ukrainian experts colleagues on building an economically strong, as the op�malofmodel. OneRussian expert said that “no model would work with Russia.” and 0 Russian experts). democraticGreece−Turkey and legal state as factors shaping citizens’ perceptions of Ukraine’s Russian experts chose independence. the

following options: Finland–USSR (33%), Canada–USA (22%), Poland– Ukrainian experts chose the model following models: Finland– Germany (11%), Georgia–Russia (11%). One Russian expert answered: “The optimal for bilateral USSR (20%), Poland–Germany (15%), It is also interesting to note that German experts (56%) relations would be Canada−USA, but in reality, it is unlikely and does not fully meet the interests ofCroatia–Serbia the place more hope on abandoning anti-Ukrainian propa­ (15%), FRG–USSR (15%), Canada–USA (10%), Japan–­ Ukrainian people.” ganda in the Russian media than their Russian (33%) and Russia (5%). In addition, two Ukrainian experts in their German experts chose the following models: Poland–Germany (22%), Croatia–Serbia (22%), Finland– Ukrainian (20%) colleagues do. own answer options proposed Poland–Russia as the opUSSR (11%), Japan–Russia (11%), Canada–USA (11%). One German expert expressed the opinion that timal model; one expert

named Greece–Turkey as the opnone of the proposed models really fitted. Another German expert suggested Cyprus−Turkey as the Despite the widespread view in Ukraine that most Rustimal model. One expert said that “no model would work optimal model. sians will never perceive Ukrainians as a separate nawith Russia.” tion and Ukraine as an independent country, only one Ukrainian expert surveyed chose the “nothing will help” Russian experts chose the following options: Finland–USSR option, and no Russian or German expert chose this op(33%), Canada–USA (22%), Poland–Germany (11%), tion (see Chart 11). Georgia–Russia (11%). One Russian expert answered: “The optimal model for bilateral relations would be CanaOffering own answer option, one Ukrainian expert sugda–USA, but in reality, it is unlikely and does not fully meet gests that Russians will begin to perceive Ukrainians as a the interests of the Ukrainian people.” separate nation only if the Russian Federation is

disinteGerman experts chose the following models: Poland–­ grated itself. At the same time, another Ukrainian expert Germany (22%), Croatia–Serbia (22%), Finland–USSR (11%), suggests that most Russians already perceive Ukraine as a Japan–Russia (11%), Canada–USA (11%). One German separate state and Ukrainians as a separate nation. 19 FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION – UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? 27 Chart 12. Chart 12. Relations between which countries could be considered as the Relations between which countries could be considered as the optimal model for coexistence of Ukraine and Russia? (one answer) optimal model for coexistence of Ukraine and Russia? (one answer) 15% 11% 22% Poland – Germany 0% 0% 0% North Macedonia – Greece 15% 0% 22% Croatia – Serbia 0% 11% 0% Georgia – Russia 20% Finland – USSR 11% 15% 0% 0% FRG – USSR 5% 0% 11% Japan – Russia 10% Canada – USA 22% 11% 0% 0% 0% Ireland – United Kingdom 0%

Ukrainian experts 33% 20% Russian experts 40% 60% 80% 100% German experts expert expressed the opinion that none of the proposed Answering the question “What can be the contribution models really fitted. Another German expert suggested of Ukrainian and Russian civil society organizations to the Potential facilitators ­Cyprus–Turkey as the optimal model. settlement of the conflict between the two countries?” (respondents could choose up to three answers or suggest their own): Among the answers to the question “Which external player has the best opportunity to contribute to 3.6 POTENTIAL FACILITATORS the settlement of the conflict (in the broadest sense) Ukraine and experts Russia?”(78% (respondents – between Russian and German of each) most could choose one option or suggest own), there were twochose obvious of theexpert expertsplatforms − the for Among the answers to the question “Whichtheir external playoften thefavourites option “offer er hasUnited the

bestStates opportunity contributeUnion. to the settlement discussions on issues that are experts taboo orgave too an sensitive and thetoEuropean At the same time, while Russian and German of theequal conflict (in the broadest sense) between Ukraine and for politicians”, while only 25% of Ukrainian number of votes to both these actors, Ukrainian experts gave a clear preference to the Unitedexperts Russia?” (respondents chose this option; States (see Chartcould 13): choose one option or suggest – instead, the most popular response option of Ukrainian their own), there were two obvious favourites of the experts  States Unitedand States: 50% of Ukrainian, of Russian and 33%(55%) of German experts was toexperts; “contribute to solving the prob– the United the European Union. At 33% the same lems of human rights time, while Russian and German experts gave an equal numEuropean Union: 5% of Ukrainian, 33% of Russian and 33% of Germanviolations, experts. particularly in Crimea

and ORDLO” (that was not the most often choice of ber of votes to both these actors, Ukrainian experts gave a It is also worth least a small placed hopes on aexperts settlement Germanexperts (44%) and Russian (33%) – see Chart clear preference to the noting United that Statesat(see Chart 13): number of surveyed at the bilateral level, on the OSCE, G-7 and NATO, but no expert chose the UN, the Charter of which 14). listedStates: maintaining peace as 33% the first purpose. – United 50% ofofUkrainian, of Russian and 33% of German experts; were noticeable Criminal differences in the frequency Offering own answer options, one Ukrainian expertThere named thealso International Court, while – European Union: 5% of Ukrainian, 33% of Russian and with which experts from different countries chose the folanother suggested that the conflict would end in case of internal changes and transformations in Russia 33% of German experts. lowing options: itself. One Russian expert suggested

Kazakhstan as an external facilitator One German expert said that the EU, France, Germany and the U.S together could–help “contribute to increasing interest of Ukrainian and RusIt is also worth noting that at least a small number of sur- sian societies in settling conflict and starting peaceful coexistence”: 56% of German, 44% of Russian and 35% of Ukrainian experts; veyed experts placed hopes on a settlement at the bilateral level, on the OSCE, G-7 and NATO, but no expert chose the UN, the Charter of which listed maintaining of peace as the first purpose. – Offering own answer options, one Ukrainian expert named the International Criminal Court, while another suggested that the conflict would end in case of internal changes and transformations in Russia itself. One Russian expert suggested Kazakhstan as an external facilitator One German expert said that the EU, France, Germany and the U.S together could help “help reduce tensions and build confidence between Ukrainian

and Russian peoples”: 67% of German, 44% of Russian and only 15% of Ukrainian experts. In general, the surveyed Ukrainian experts placed less hopes on the potential contribution of civil society organizations to the settlement of the conflict than their Russian and German counterparts did (see Chart 14). 20 RESEARCH RESULTS 28 Chart 13. Chart 13. What external actor has the best opportunity to contribute to What external actor has the best opportunity to contribute to settlement of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia? (one answer) settlement of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia? (one answer) 5% EU Germany 0% 0% 0% France 0% 0% 0% 33% 33% 5% 0% 0% United Kingdom 50% 33% 33% USA 0% 0% 0% China 5% 11% 0% G-7 Council of Europe 0% 0% 0% OSCE 10% 0% 11% UN 0% 0% 0% NATO 5% 0% 11% No one; conflict should be settled on bilateral level 10% 11% 0% 29 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Offering own answer option, one Ukrainian expert suggested that NGOs could

offer non-public expert platforms for dialogue onUkrainian the existential issues underlyingGerman the conflict. Another expert suggested experts Russian experts experts “contributing to the overthrow of the authoritarian aggressive regime in Russia.” One expert proposed strengthening the capabilities of the Ukrainian army through volunteer organizations. Another expert said that the civil society sector in Russia was destroyed, so it could not exert influence. Chart 14. Answering the question “What can be the contribution of Ukrainian and Russian civil society 14. What can be the contribution of Ukrainian Russian society What can be the contribution oftoUkrainian and Russian society organizations to settlement theand conflict? (one civil to three answers) organizations theChart settlement ofcivil the conflict between the two of countries?” (respondents could organizations to settlement of the conflict? (one to three answers) choose up to three answers or suggest their own):

55% Contribute to solving problems of human(78% rights of violations,  Russian and the German experts each) most often 33%chose the option “offer expert platforms particularly in Crimea and ORDLO 44% for discussions on issues that are taboo or too sensitive for politicians”, while only 25% of 15% Help reduce tensions and build confidence between Ukrainian Ukrainian experts chose this option; and Russian peoples 44% 67% instead, mostinterest popular response option of Ukrainian experts (55%) was to “contribute to 35% Contribute to the increasing of Ukrainian and Russian 44% societies in settling conflict and starting peaceful coexistence solving the problems of human rights violations, particularly 56% in Crimea and ORDLO” (that was the most for often choice German (33%) experts − see Chart 14). 25% Offernot expert platforms discussions onof issues that are (44%) taboo and Russian  78% or too sensitive for politicians 78% There were also noticeable differences in

the frequency with which experts from different countries 20% Promote mutual awareness of the activities and positions of chose the following options: 33% civil society organizations of both countries 22%  Civil“contribute to increasing of role Ukrainian and Russian societies in settling conflict and 20% society organizations cannot play interest any significant in 11% starting peaceful coexistence”: settlement of the conflict 56% of German, 11%44% of Russian and 35% of Ukrainian experts;  40%and Russian 60% peoples”: 80% 67%100% “help reduce tensions and build confidence0%between20% Ukrainian of German, 44% of Russian and only 15% of Ukrainian experts. Ukrainian experts Russian experts German experts In general, the surveyed Ukrainian experts placed less hopes on the potential contribution of civil society organizations to the settlement of the conflict than their Russian and German counterparts did Offering own(see answer one Ukrainian expert sugChart option,

14). gested that NGOs could offer non-public expert platforms Prospects for further research for dialogue on the existential issues underlying the conflict. Another expert suggested “contributing to the overthrow of the authoritarian aggressive regime in Russia” In addition to identifying positions of Ukrainian, Russian and German experts important for the better One expert proposed strengthening the capabilities of the understanding of Ukraine−Russia relations, this study also highlighted the need for further Ukrainian army comprehensive through volunteer organizations. and thorough study ofAnother this issue. This would help to shape strategic vision based on expert said thatanalysis the civilofsociety sector in Russia was deinterconnections of the entire complex of factors affecting these relations both in the stroyed, so it could not exert influence. bilateral dimension and in the regional and global contexts. In order to elaborate the issues for such future research, the

surveyed experts from Ukraine, Russia and Germany were asked to suggest their own options of questions that should be considered in the context of studying Ukraine−Russia relations. Experts named the following issues:  consequences of the occupation of Crimea for bilateral relations;  who is most interested in the continuation of the conflict;  the role of the elites of the two countries in inciting and possible settlement of the conflict;  how to shape political will to resolve the conflict; 21 FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION – UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? 4 PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH In addition to identifying positions of Ukrainian, Russian and German experts important for the better understanding of Ukraine–Russia relations, this study also highlighted the need for further comprehensive and thorough study of this issue. This would help to shape strategic vision based on analysis of interconnections of the entire complex of

factors affecting these relations both in the bilateral dimension and in the regional and global contexts. – In order to elaborate the issues for such future research, the surveyed experts from Ukraine, Russia and Germany were asked to suggest their own options of questions that should be considered in the context of studying Ukraine– Russia relations. Experts named the following issues: – – – – – – – – consequences of the occupation of Crimea for bilateral relations; 22 who is most interested in the continuation of the conflict; the role of the elites of the two countries in inciting and possible settlement of the conflict; how to shape political will to resolve the conflict; possible options for implementation and modernization of the Minsk agreements; study of a long-term scenario for 20-25 years, taking into account one generation change; who and how can influence Russia’s behaviour on the world stage; how to change the imperial mentality of Russians;

how the respondent identifies events in eastern Ukraine (as Russia–Ukraine war, Russian aggression, or civil war, uprising), in order to correlate this answer with other positions. IMPRINT AUTHOR IMPRINT Maksym Khylko, Russian and Belarusian Studies Program Director, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Representation in Ukraine 34, Pushkinska Street, Kyiv 01004 Ukraine EXPERTS WHO TOOK PART IN THE SURVEY Anton Barbashin, Sergey Belanovsky, Mykola Bielieskov, Sergiy Gerasymchuk, Olga Gulina, Olena Zakharova, Julia Kazdobina, Mykola Kapitonenko, Nadia Koval, Valeriy Kravchenko, Reinhard Krumm, Stefan Meister, Hennadiy Maksak, Volodymyr Manzhola, Oleksiy Melnyk, Viktor Mironenko, Dmitriy Ofitserov-Belskiy, Sarah Pagung, Garry Poluschkin, Maksym Rozumny, Marcel Röthig, Mykhailo Stepyko, Ihor Todorov, Andreas Umland, Sergiy Fedunyak, Artem Fylypenko, Sabine Fischer, Karsten D. Voigt, Dmytro Shulga, and four more Ukrainian, four Russian and one

German experts who preferred to remain anonymous. Responsible: Marcel Röthig | Resident Representative for Ukraine Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Tel: +38 (044) 234 0038 | Fax: +38 (044) 451 4031 http://fes.kievua To order a publication, contact us at mail@fes.kievua Commercial use of all media published by the FriedrichEbert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES. FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION REPRESENTATION IN UKRAINE The Friedrich Ebert Foundation is a political fund headquartered in Germany. Our activities are focused on the key ideas and values of social democracy: freedom, justice and solidarity. Our international cooperation is facilitated by a network of representative offices in over 100 countries around the world. Our efforts are aimed at supporting peaceful cooperation and human rights, providing assistance to the creation and consolidation of democratic institutions based on the principles of social The views expressed in this publication are not

necessarily those of the­ Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the author works. justice and rule of law, such as free trade unions and strong civil society. We actively stand for a social, democratic and competitive Europe in the framework of European integration processes. Guided by these principles since its opening in 1996, the FES Representation in Kyiv has supported dialogue with Ukrainian partners on a wide range of issues such as sustainable democratic development and human safety. FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – TOO LITTLE, TOO SLOW. WHY EMPLOYEES IN GEORGIA, MOLDOVA, AND UKRAINE DO NOT BENEFIT FROM THE EU ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS UKRAINE RUSSIA: IS CONFLICT-FREE COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE? Ò Ukrainian, Russian and German experts share the opinion that a quick settlement of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is impossible, and the popular “simple” recipes for settlement cause scepticism among the surveyed specialists. Ò There is no consensus

among experts on the optimal model of coexistence between Ukraine and Russia, but there is a shared vision of areas of interaction that are the most and the least risky for bilateral relations. 24 Ò According to the surveyed experts, the U.S and the EU are the external players that have the best opportunities to contribute to the settlement of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia