Gazdasági Ismeretek | USA » Ring of Safety, Oil and Gas Drilling Pad Setbacks

Source: http://www.doksinet RING OF SAFETY Oil & Gas Drilling Pad Setbacks A STUDY BY BOB ARRINGTON, BSME, P.E 12/16/12 Edited 8/24/15 1 Source: http://www.doksinet Foreword This Ring of Safety document supports the concept that oil and gas drilling sites and production equipment should include a 1000 foot radius safety buffer zone extending horizontally from each pad. Close proximity to occupied buildings, albeit they are institutional, residential, or businesses, without consensus of all affected parties, is an unwise unilateral decision either by State or industry. While each catastrophic event that has occurred on rigs/pads may have been prevented, the driving forces leading to such events still exist and such events will recur in the future. While there are actually 3 ‘Rings’ to consider, safety, health, and nuisance, they each have particular mitigations that can be applied. This paper treats problems that deal with safety up to the point that safety and health

considerations begin to merge. Industry has, not adequately addressed the safety issues that occur on pads; in particular, the judgments required on hundreds of daily decisions and responses that must be made in operations. An often used term “best management practices” is inadequate to define requirements of safety. Because the dangers of industrial failures can reach beyond the work sites, the 1000 foot distance setback is a reasonable and feasible rule for risk mitigation. This 1000 foot should be enforced from any part of the pad It is a minimum consideration as neighboring damages can still occur and failure effects must be quickly stopped. Many of the failure effects can be time dependent for increasing damage “Best management practice” needs to be replaced by “best technology, training and equipment available”! While situations may arise requiring an engineered variance from a mandated setback, the rules should provide strict and complete guidelines for such

alternatives with safety and accident prevention the primary criteria. 2 Source: http://www.doksinet Contents Blowouts .4 Explosions.5 Fires.6 Sour Gas.10 Sand and Dust.11 Conclusions.12 Appendix.13 Links provided to various picture and data sources. References used: Perry, Perry’s Chemical Engineering Handbook, 4th Edition, 1963 Eshbach, Handbook of Engineering Fundamentals, 2nd Edition - 7th Printing, 1958 Crane, Flow of Fluids Through Valves, Fittings, and Pipe, Technical Paper No. 410, 1970 Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNl/TM-2012/411, Studies for the Requirements of Automatic and Remotely Shutoff Valves on hazardous Liquids and Natural Gas Pipeline with Respect to Public and Environmental safety, October 4,2012, Managed by UT-Battelle for the Department of Energy Gas Research Institute, A Model for Sizing High Consequence Areas Associated with Natural Gas Pipelines, Stephens, et al, GRI-00/0189, October 2000 3 Source: http://www.doksinet  Blowout Figure 1

An aerial photo of oil sprayed over 15 acres downwind of a runaway oil well owned by Denver-based SM Energy Company. The well 12 miles east of Cheyenne, Wyo., is among the first drilled in a rush to tap the Niobrara Shale underlying Colorado, Wyoming and Nebraska. AP file. http://wwwpostindependentcom/article/20110210/VALLEYNEWS/110209843 A blowout is the uncontrolled release of crude oil and/or natural gas from an oil well or gas well after pressure control systems have failed. http://enwikipediaorg/wiki/Blowout (well drilling) Blowout can also cause drill pipe, mud, cements, fracking fluids, and produced water to be ejected from the bore propelled by high pressure. The drilling materials can be followed by production waters, gases and/or petroleum. While there are many devices and operator procedures to prevent blowouts, they still occur with often deadly results. Because operators are continually doing a balancing of downhole conditions against machine operation and progress,

there is always opportunity for misjudgment. Failures of equipment can contribute and a combination of both failure and misjudgment is often the situation. Blowouts can occur on rework or swabbing operations beyond initial drilling. Deep Water Horizon “When the cement failed, gas began to force its way up the riser. At this point, concrete well plugs in the pipe should have blocked the gas. But contrary to normal practice, the final plug had not been installed, and the salt water was not heavy enough to stop the high pressure gas from rising. On the evening of April 20, a geyser of seawater erupted onto the rig, shooting 240 feet into the air. This was soon followed by the eruption of a slushy combination of mud, gas and water. At this point workers knew they were in danger because the mud could only have come from 10,000 feet down, Bea said. On the rig, the gas component of the slushy material quickly transitioned into a fully gaseous state and then ignited into a series of

explosions and then a firestorm. Workers immediately attempted to activate the blowout preventer, but it too failed.” http://www.wswsorg/articles/2010/may2010/spil-m14shtml Figure 2 http://www.dreamyogacom/a-global-nightmare-the-gulf-oil-spill Flash player: http://www.roughneckcitycom/Nabors Rig 417 Blowouthtml (On video & Slide show on PowerPoint) http://www.roughneckcitycom/Oil Rig Blows Out Tubinghtml (On video) http://www.roughneckcitycom/Oilfield Blowouts Videos hthtml (On video) 4 Source: http://www.doksinet  Explosion One person is reported dead after an oil and gas well explosion just south of Bolivar Township and 12 miles south of Canton, Ohio. The explosion happened at 9:34 am while the two workers were painting at the well site. “After a storage tank cover shot about 100 feet into the air, Mutschelknaus said fuel leaked down the driveway into a neighbor’s field. “The driveway all the way through the ditch into the neighbor’s field was on fire,” he

said. That’s when he saw the green cap of the oil tank land an estimated 50 yards away from its original location.” http://ecowatch.org/2012/breaking-oil-and-gas-well/ Figure 3 This photo collage of the oil and gas well explosion today in Bolivar, Ohio was put together by Bill Baker. Photos by Robert West (top two and bottom right) and Mary Daum (bottom left) Following blowouts there are often explosions and fires. However, explosions are not limited to rig operation. Tank storage of volatiles, welding cylinders, high pressure accumulator tanks, chemical drums, fuel tanks, and any pressure, vapor, or dust containers can be involved in explosions. These explosions could either be primary from or secondary to fires or equipment mishandling. Exploding tanks, cylinders and drums can become airborne burning missiles. An air compressor tank that blew up became a burning missile because of compressor oil accumulation in the tank. Chemical and fuel drums, even railroad tank cars, have

become flaming bombs launched from their original locations. Gas Explosion Kills Bystander Quarter Mile Away http://www.nbcchicagocom/news/local/Gas-Plant-Explosion-Blows-Out-Wall-Kills-Bystander-78719792html Black Elk Energy, based in Houston, operates 155 oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. On top of the already hazardous working environments associated with the oil industry, these facilities have attracted safety criticism in three separate incidents leading up to this explosion. One of these incidents involved another fire. The Department of the Interior concluded that a malfunctioning battery charger ignited on the platform. Given the close proximity to numerous flammable chemicals, any fire on an oil rig can easily burn out of control and cause an explosion. Figure 4 http://www.oilandgasinjurylawyerscom/blog/2012/11/oil-rig-explosion-was-black-elks-fourth-incident-since-2011shtml From natural gas explosions there can be strong pressure waves sent out and earth shaking

tremors. The recent Springfield, MA gas explosion took windows out in a 3 block radius, which even for a ‘short’ block, would be approximately 900 feet surrounding. 42 buildings were damaged in this proximity. On a pad there may be other wells and gathering pipelines at risk during a current operation. In the linked case, a gathering or transport line was breeched by a backhoe, and appears to have also damaged and ignited at least two wells. http://www.roughneckcitycom/pipeline firehtml (On video) 5 Source: http://www.doksinet  Fire Figure 5 Figure 6 Link in Picture (Slide Show) http://pittsburgh.cbslocalcom/2011/02/23/washington-county-avella-explosion-fire/ Fires can involve tanks, drill rig, trucks on site, chemical, or volatiles storage. This can involve the release of additional fumes, smoke and new volatiles. Secondary explosions can occur from other units of the same equipment. Fires, from the fuel sources of drilling operations can be intense enough to cause heat

radiation induced charring, blistering or ignition of nearby structures. In the fighting of well fires, to turn off valves, remove wreckage, plug the well, etc., workers approach in a metal clad shielded enclosure wearing protective suits. In Table 1, is data and calculations that show radiated heat can cause damages and/or fires at 1000 feet. The interval between blowout and gas ignition can affect the size of the resulting fireball and the extent of explosive damage. Gas buoyancy and wind velocity add variation However, the source report cited in Figure 7 also indicates a rising ‘mushroom’ cloud that is borne out in pictures and studies of flares. A slight breeze can tip this cloud downwind Gas flow from nozzle(s) is a factor to volume of fuel supplied but formation pressures of 2500 psi are available from overburden at 5000 feet depth and the nozzle can be a nominal 6 inch pipe. There may be multiple wells involved in secondary damages. Damage to nearby facilities from pad fires

is a function of time as well as energy flux intensity. Damage generally increases the longer the fire burns. It can be seen in Table 1 - Calculations that at a 1000 foot setback, materials can reach ignition or pyrolysis points (Table 2 data values). Coupled with broken windows, this can include building interiors. Exterior materials and dry organics in open spaces may already be ignited. The 1000 foot setback represents a minimum distance to mitigate initiation of structural fires if site burning takes place for 24 hours or less in a 50 sq. meter flame profile. Pictures from Gas pipeline fire, Williams Pipeline, Appomattox, VA, in 2008. Furthest home 1025 feet from rupture See Appendix for discussion on calculations of pipeline vs. well pad fires 6 Source: http://www.doksinet Figure 7 Flame Profile and Source Summation Source illustration drawings above from page 4 of: By this Figure, for a flame of 50 m2, flux would be the summation 50 x q/A, Where q/A is a single point

source. 7 Source: http://www.doksinet 8 Source: http://www.doksinet Table 1 Calculations For 21,666 gas wells gas production rate per well was 5.8 million cf/day This would consider flow through smaller production nozzles But, flow could be through an open nozzle up to 6 in. nominal pipe http://www.eiagov/pub/oil gas/petrosystem/co tablehtml This is 2.417 x 105 cf/h or at 1000 btu/cf := 2417 x 108 btu/h q = σ T4 A Stefan-Boltzmann Law σ = 5.6703 x 10-8 (W/m2 K4) - The Stefan-Boltzmann Constant (Metric) or σ = 0.1714 x 10-8 ( btu/(h ft2 R4)) in Imperial units http://www.engineeringtoolboxcom/radiation-heat-transfer-d 431html Then q / A = σ R4 btu/ ft2 * For a temperature of 1950 C (2223.15 K), it is 9/5 (K) or 400167 R q / A = 0.1714 x 10-8 x (400167)4 = 43969673 btu/h ft2 energy heat flux in Imperial units = 4.4 x 105 btu/h ft2 energy heat flux in Imperial units The average well is producing 2.417 x108/ 44 x 105 = 549 times the fuel needed to produce a unit source (ft2) of

heat flux per unit of time This then would be a sum of flame q/A’s showing 549 unit areas producing the flux. The unit area is ft2, and converting to m2, 549 ft2 x 0.09290 m2/ft2 = 51 m2 single point source Calculations to Show Heat Energy Radiation at Various Setback Locations q = σ T4 A Stefan-Boltzmann Law where q = heat transfer per unit time (W) σ = 5.6703 10-8 (W/m2K4) - The StefanBoltzmann Constant T = absolute temperature Kelvin (K) A = area of the emitting body (m2) Methane burns @ 1950 C (or 2223.15 K = T)* In flare operations, industry has claimed over 95% + efficiency. EPA tests showed 98% or more 2 efficiency. Reducing the area to 50m is a 2% reduction of efficiency consideration. the Appendix for EPA data See q / A = σ T4 (W/m2) = 1385099.91 x 1/1000 2 (W/kW/m ) x 2 1/d = 2 kW/m energy flux for 1 m2 For a Flame ball of 50 square meters (~16.5 x 66) = 50q/A Ft. Distance Meters Distance 2 d Single pt. Heat flux kW/m 1000 750 500 350 200 150 304.8 228.6

152.4 106.68 60.96 45.72 92903.0 52258.0 23225.8 11380.6 3716.1 2090.3 0.0149 0.0265 0.0596 0.1217 0.3727 0.6626 0.7455 1.3253 2.9818 6.0853 18.6364 33.1313 2 50q/a Atmosphere Attenuation @ 1.7%/3048 m kW/m 2 0.6187 1.1563 2.7284 5.7233 18.0027 32.2865 24 hr. Exposure w/90% absorption for dark objects 2 KW/m 24 hour total 13.36 24.98 58.93 123.62 388.86 697.39 2 q/A= for unit m is 2 W/m , then divided by 2 1000 W/kW = kW/m 1385099.91 Wood pyrolysis > flashover point Wood ignites http://www.engineeringtoolboxcom/radiation-heat-transfer-d 431html * With volatiles and/or petroleum, flame temperature can be higher. 9 Source: http://www.doksinet Table 2 - Charts of Values http://en.wikipediaorg/wiki/Adiabatic flame In daily life, the vast majority of flames one encounters are those of organic compounds including wood, wax, fat, common plastics, propane, and gasoline. The constant-pressure adiabatic flame temperature of such substances in air is in a relatively narrow

range around 1950 °C. This is because, in terms of stoichiometry, the combustion of an organic compound with n carbons involves breaking roughly 2n C–H bonds, n C–C bonds, and 1.5n O2 bonds to form roughly n CO2 molecules and n H2O molecules. Because most combustion processes that happen naturally occur in the open air, there is nothing that confines the gas to a particular volume like the cylinder in an engine. As a result, these substances will burn at a constant pressure allowing the gas to expand during the process Adiabatic flame temperature (constant pressure) of common gases/Materials Fuel Oxidizer (°C) (°F) Acetylene (C2H2) air 2500 4532 Butane (C4H10) air 1970 3578 Hydrogen (H2) air 2210 4010 Methane (CH4) Natural gas air air 1950 1960 3542 3562 [2] Propane (C3H8) air 1980 3596 Wood air 1980 3596 Kerosene air 2093 [3] 3801 Light fuel oil air 2104 [3] 3820 Medium fuel oil air 2101 [3] 3815 Heavy fuel oil air 2102 [3] 3817

http://en.wikipediaorg/wiki/Thermal radiation kW/m2 Effect Maximum flux measured in a post-flashover compartment 170 Thermal Protective Performance test for personal protective equipment 80 Fiberboard ignites at 5 seconds 52 Wood ignites, given time 29 Typical beginning of flashover at floor level of a residential room 20 Human skin: Sudden pain and second-degree burn blisters after 5 seconds 16 Wood produces ignitable volatiles by pyrolysis 12.5 Human skin: Pain after 30 seconds, second-degree burn blisters after 9 seconds 10.4 Human skin: Second-degree burn blisters after 18 seconds 6.4 Human skin: Second-degree burn blisters after 30 seconds 4.5 2.5 Human skin: Burns after prolonged exposure, radiant flux exposure typically encountered during firefighting Sunlight, sunburns potentially within 30 minutes 1.4 Spontaneous combustion of wood occurs at 12-13 kilowatts per square meter, and values as low as 7.5 have been reported http://wwwsafticom/articles/toohothtm Oak Ridge National

Laboratory - Managed by UT-Battelle for the Department of Energy ORNL/TM-20121411, pg. 22 10 Source: http://www.doksinet  Sour Gas This graphic shows the burning of H2S to SO2, but the SO2 is also problematic and is a health concern. The SO2 plumes and touchdown occurs. Flaring does not eliminate H2S problems, but can create other issues. Figure 8 http://www.slidesharenet/bluegringo/h2s#btnNext Sour gas Hydrogen Sulfide is a poisonous gas that can occur naturally or be introduced into a well. The gas is heavier than air and, sufficiently high concentrations can be immediately lethal or cause delayed death. And it can cause many other traumas It can quickly render a person’s sense of smell useless and its’ characteristic rotten egg smell is lost by the victim. On sites, monitors are available, but nearby residents have no such protection. The COGCC has a chart, Radius of Exposure Calculation for – Pasquill-Gifford Equation, that they like to show that 500ppm H2S@ 3.5M

cfpd would only amount to a 100 ppm at 150 foot offset distance. This chart says a half sphere of a 150 foot radius would only have 100 ppm at the radius points because of dilution from 500ppm at wellhead. Very nice ideal if H2S were the same molecular weight as air; however, H2S is heavier than air and forms a spreading blanket. The gradient would be 500 ppm as a maximum on the ground and climbing upward with continued flow as the blanket spread and thickened. Meanwhile, the buoyant natural gas separates and floats upward. A pad berm could increase this upward gradient by inhibiting the ‘blanket’ spread A breeze will typically blow the H2S will funnel into a spreading fan on flat terrain or the cloud may follow ground contours and head off the pad downhill. And concentration in the ‘plume’ may be quite high; i.e 250 ppm toward the center even far from the point of emission, contrary to the idealized dilution chart. This is also exhibited in the oil pattern downwind from the

well head in Figure 1 and in the sand cloud of Figure 10. An account of encounters with H2S: http://www.straightcom/article/killing-fields (Narrative story Appendix) A berm around the pad between well(s) and buildings could assist in directing flow away from buildings, but would not offer as much protection if wind direction is toward buildings. Figure 9 http://www.slidesharenet/bluegringo/h2s#btnNext 11 Source: http://www.doksinet  Sand and Dust Figure 10 http://www.youtubecom/watch?feature=player detailpage&v=Fd9gPMpKk5w#t=48s (On video) This is frack sand being loaded from ‘sand can’ truck to holding tanks positioned in a ‘V’. It can cause silicosis (Potter’s lung) and lung cancer. “In Parachute, the cloud of frack sand went up like a plume of smoke to about 300 feet and with a breeze shift ‘fell’ over on Parachute and I-70 to the Southwest, then went up in the air again, and then fell over on I-70 to the Northwest. Between sand truck arrivals

thereafter, personnel put filter bags on the top relief hatchways of the tank and the dust was reduced to the tank vicinity.” Bob Arrington as witnessed at 6:30 to 7:45 pm on 8/2/11 http://www.youtubecom/dgdevanney#p/u/5/sEois0-TPCw (On video) Observed workers did not have respirators and respiratory problems may not manifest for many years. Another problem encountered on this Parachute pad prior to this drilling, was the pad preparation was not adequately dust suppressed and allowed to dry out after initial suppression. The soil is heavily alkali laden and blew up on surrounding homes causing nose, eye, and throat irritations along with asthma flare-ups. The dust went on to homes about a half mile away (the Reserve and Battlement Creek Villages of Battlement Mesa). This sand problem could be mitigated, but it is the responsibility of sub-contractors and it seems poor practices with such operations are wide spread throughout the country. The filters on vent hatches are functionally

inadequate when installed, often not installed, and often blow off when installed. Dust suppression on a pad must be on-going during construction and given a more permanent coating for operation. Continued monitoring and suppression must be practiced However, it often becomes a low priority for the operator and is neglected until complaints come in. This practice places it in the setback mitigation categorization until dust suppression becomes an operating necessity and subject to rule violation enforcement by operators and regulators respectively. 12 Source: http://www.doksinet  Conclusions Each or all of the industrial hazards treated in this report can violate the surface owners’ right to protection, by government, for their safety, health, and well being. Urban areas that have government levels below state level does not relieve the State of its responsibility to ensure these protections. However, if government fails its’ responsibility at any level, it is mandamus for

any other level to act on its own laws, in effect, albeit air pollution to zoning. People may resort in the future to obtaining writ of mandamus to gain those enforcements from their government bodies and agencies. As the minimum standard application of preventative mitigation through setback, this study provides information and situational description that could establish negligence in legal actions resulting from denial of such protections. In order to establish negligence as a Cause of Action under the law of TORTS, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct, the defendants negligent conduct was the cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed or damaged. http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionarycom/Negligence+(law) This report identifies specific issues of the oil and gas exploration/extraction process that presents hazards that are

best mitigated by distance. The 1000 foot setback studied is not absolute protection as incident duration or intensity can reduce or eliminate any protective effects and is only a minimum consideration. Part of permitting should require demonstration and documentation that company and its subcontractors have sufficient technology and expertise to meet all construction and mitigation requirements of the location and/or the use of properly qualified sub-contractors that meet the requirements of the location. Permit applications should include perimeter map of the pad that will support the wells and production facilities, and the unoccupied setback. Setback will extend from that perimeter 1000 feet. A requirement that pads include a 1000 foot setback puts an obligation on landowners to realize the ramifications of their future plans if they are part of surface leasing or other agreements with the mineral extractors. In the manner of accepted building permit laws, a new setback rule should

mandate mitigation upgrades to existing pads and support facilities within a ¼ mile (the latter including air borne health hazards mitigation); and, should provide for the engineering considerations and close scrutiny of any special requirements for any exceptions that are less than 1000 foot setback. This still does not address all the health issues*, but operations can be mitigated to reduce the contamination of air and water that are involved by the introduction of health threatening components and chemicals, including drill cuttings and spillage contamination. This mitigation would be the “health hazard mitigation zone”. Then finally, there is the “nuisance mitigation zone” These latter two zones may be coincidental and/or additive to the ring of safety depending on circumstances of the nearby occupied buildings. Even with this ring or rings, evacuations will still be required in accidents, but resulting damage may be minimized and, hopefully, sudden death events avoided

for neighbors. *Dr.s Lisa McKenzie, Roxana Z Witter, Lee S Newman, John L Adgate, in Human health risk assessment of air emissions from development of unconventional natural gas resources. from Colorado School of Public Health, University of Colorado, Anschutz Medical Campus, Aurora, Colorado, USA “Residents living ≤½ mile from wells are at greater risk for health effects from NGD than are residents living >½ mile from wells. Subchronic exposures to air pollutants during well completion activities present the greatest potential for health effects. The subchronic non-cancer hazard index (HI) of 5 for residents ≤½ mile from wells was driven primarily by exposure to trimethylbenzenes, xylenes, and aliphatic hydrocarbons. Chronic HIs were 1 and 04 for residents ≤½ mile from wells and >½ mile from wells, respectively. Cumulative cancer risks were 10 in a million and 6 in a million for residents living ≤½ mile and >½ mile from wells, respectively, with benzene as

the major contributor to the risk.” 13 Source: http://www.doksinet Appendix Author’s note on fire calculations: In Table 1, I have utilized two reports for figures or charts to demonstrate concept of heat radiation and its’ effects. These two reports actually treat heat radiation for pipeline ruptures The Oak Ridge National Laboratory report for the equation on heat radiation borrowed from other sources for factors, one a 0.20 emissivity and one a 0.35 combustion efficiency that reduced the heat fuel quantity available to 7% total of gas released These factors can be traced back to industry supported sources. The authors, by their own references, say they are conservative in application. I chose to utilize the basic heat radiation equations established by proof, experimentation and stoichiometry. I used the EPA report on flare efficiency to ascertain burn efficiency because it is closer to the actual pipe end situation. The flares are different from buried pipelines in both

general orientation and burning characteristics. Pipeline fires have been observed quite often, with detached flames up to 20 to 30 feet. The EPA flare report found detached flames with efficiency as low as 64%; but, only with very low heat value gas in the 100-200 btu/cf heat value range. This finding disputes the 035 factor by almost twice the efficiency and 5 times higher heat values of gas (1000btu/cf). In higher heat values up to 2183 btu/cf, EPA flare efficiency dropped to 69% only with improper steam quenching. Steam quenching is not a consideration in these pad fires. Industry has claimed no less than 95% flare burn efficiency and usually the 98% or greater number. In well fires, detached flames would be a rare pipe orientation situation, and there is ample air supply with hot metal reigniting. I have used the data from Colorado daily average production per well that yields flux from the 1950oC (4002oR) adiabatic burning temperature of natural gas and the flame ball size of at

least 549 ft2 (51m2) area resulting from having average 549 times the minimum fuel supply for a1ft2 flux area. Converting units to metric, I reduced the single point radiation area by 1 m2 to account for a 98% burn efficiency decline for a flare. I added the reduction rate for atmospheric distance reducing transmission of heat flux of 1.7% per 100 ft for the reduction of actual emissivity. This analysis does not include the potential intensified effects of delayed ignition and ultimate initial fireball extent. It does not calculate other effects, as wind intensity or blown out petroleum products, paraffin, or individual flaming objects. The heat radiation effect charts, in Table 2, are agreeable from the several sources for effects on various targets. Bob Arrington 14 Source: http://www.doksinet EPA Report on Flares (excerpts): 15 Source: http://www.doksinet Killing Fields by Ben Parfitt on Jul 8, 2004 at 9:00 am • Story When Moe Holman crested the hill 20 years ago and

saw the faint, dirty-yellow cloud creeping across the road downhill of him, he quickly braked his car and slapped the switch that shut off the air vents. Holman, who knew this patch of Northern Alberta better than most local farmers, couldnt quite believe his eyes. The cloud of sour gas could only have come from one place, and that was a well almost eight kilometres away. After realizing he was clear of the clouds path, Holman got out of the car and went to the trunk to retrieve his binoculars. A light breeze carried the gas east, and as the veteran oilpatch worker trained his binoculars downwind, he had plenty of time to see it drift toward a gaggle of snow geese grazing on some lush, green grass in a farmers field. As it overtook them, each of the birds dropped, most never having time to lift their beaks from the ground, let alone attempt to fly. On February 5, 2001, a young Fort St. John man named Ryan Strand, all six feet, 175 pounds of him, fell just like one of those unfortunate

birds. Twenty-five years old, he had been on the job for only 11 months when he got the last call of his brief working life. The call came from Todd Thompson, a control-room operator with Calgary-based Canadian Natural Resources Ltd., and it directed him to a well site where, only five months earlier, an uncontrolled sour-gas leak had sent a hoe operator scrambling into the gathering darkness of a late September evening. The well was near Buick Creek, a forlorn collection of houses anchored by a general store and its muddy, rutted parking lot. It was also close to the Blueberry reserve, a First Nations community at the bottom of a steeply sloped valley, which is exactly the wrong place to be during an uncontrolled sour-gas leak: the gas is heavier than air, and it sinks. During a visit to the reserve, I learned firsthand why its residents live in fear. In several places, electronic monitors sit atop tall towers, screening the air. When sour gas is detected, alarms wail and people rush

into vehicles, including a van donated by CNRL. On the lands above the reserve, searing flames sometimes shoot from stacks as energy companies flare sour gas to reduce pressure in the lines. Those stacks, and nearby compressors that sound a lot like jets screaming down runways, leave some locals feeling as if they live in a war zone. Its a place they call Little Beirut In his notes from that night, Thompson recorded that he sent Strand to the well at 21:58, where Strand was to clear a hydrate plug, frozen gas and water that had blocked the line and forced the shutdown of the wells pumpjack. Pumpjacks pull oil or gas out of wells and into the pipes carrying BCs fossil-fuel riches south They commonly shut down when hydrate plugs form. Just over one hour later, at 22:58:31, Thompson logged the first of two sour-gas leaks at the well site. Strand just had time to radio "I need help; I need help" before all talk ceased. FAR FROM BEING the exclusive worry of "fanatics"

like Alberta farmer and convicted gas-well saboteur Wiebo Ludwig, sour-gas leaks are a growing concern to residents in northeastern B.C, where young people like Strand are put in harms way every day. At a minimum, more than a dozen potentially lethal leaks occur every year. Although reliable statistics on workers "knocked down" by sour gas are unavailable, interviews with long-time energy workers suggest they are far more common than the industry and provincial governments like to admit. Fortunately, the few leaks that are reported have often occurred in remote areas far from communities. One such incident, involving Calgary-based Westcoast Gas Services Inc., now part of Duke Energy, saw a spectacular three to five million cubic feet of poison gas released into the atmosphere far to the north of Fort St. John on Victoria Day, 2000 Had the leak occurred elsewhere along northern BCs extensive network of wells and pipelines--near Chetwynd, Dawson Creek, Fort Nelson, or Fort St.

John--hundreds of holiday revellers may have died, as did 243 residents in Xiaoyang, China, in December 2003 when a sour-gas well ruptured. In what Chinese officials would later call a 25-square-kilometre "death zone", another 9,000 people were injured and 40,000 people had to flee their homes. In the meantime, . Story continues for approximately 3 ½ pages citing other anecdotal stories and interviews. http://www.straightcom/killing-fields (with emphasis added) 16 Source: http://www.doksinet Addendum 10/20/2014 http://www.eenewsnet/energywire/2014/10/20/stories/1060007532 1. SAFETY: The drilling industrys explosion problem Mike Soraghan, E&E reporter Published: Monday, October 20, 2014 Temperatures below 20 degrees Fahrenheit froze the valve on the back of Greg Bishs frack truck. To thaw it, he fetched a blowtorch and put the 4-inch flame to the metal. The explosion blew him 75 feet, over a 7-foot-tall barbed-wire fence, and killed him. It might seem dangerous

to apply a propane torch to the back of a large metal tank holding natural gas production waste, as Bish did that morning in 2010 just outside Elderton, Pa. But in the oil and gas industry, its not unusual. The oil and gas industry has more deaths from fires and explosions than any other private industry, according to an EnergyWire review of federal labor statistics. It employs less than 1 percent of the US workforce, but in the past five years it has had more than 10 percent of all workplace fatalities from fires and explosions. An investigation of the drilling industrys worker safety record and what it means for those living amid the boom. The pace dipped last year but has stayed high even as oil and gas companies, using advanced hydraulic fracturing techniques, pushed into more densely populated areas and fought to keep their exemption from regulations designed to prevent explosions at industrial sites. Industry leaders say oil and gas well sites dont have a problem with fires and

explosions. "There is little performance data showing there is a safety problem at these facilities," the American Petroleum Institute, the industrys biggest lobbying group, wrote earlier this year in a filing with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. "The risk level is not high" Brandie Hanley, however, thinks the risk level is high. In 2012, an oil well exploded in her rural northwest Ohio neighborhood. The blast killed a 19-year-old worker, Paul Sherman, and hurled an oil storage tank more than 250 feet. If it had been launched in a different direction, she said, it could have hit her duplex, or a nearby group home for disabled adults. "Nobody would have made it out of there," Hanley said. Adding to her worries, the owners drilled a new well a week later, just a little farther away. "There should be yards or miles between people and those things, but theyre right in peoples backyards," she said. "You shouldnt have to be

afraid to live where you live" Ohio allows wells to be drilled as close as 100 feet from homes. OSHA accident investigations show that explosions at well sites can hurl heavy steel tanks twice that far. 17 Source: http://www.doksinet Other states ban wells within 500 feet of homes, while some have no rules on how close a well can be. But even 500 feet might not be safe. A 2012 explosion at a compressor station in Colorado launched metal parts more than 750 feet. "If you look at the zoning requirements, they arent very strict," said Vidisha Parasram, who led a U.S Chemical Safety Board investigation into storage tank explosions. "Its literally a patchwork across the country" That CSB study found 26 explosions and fires since 1983 at conventional oil and gas sites that killed 44 members of the public and injured 25 others. Often, they were young people "hanging out" at tank sites The board, fashioned after the National Transportation Safety Board,

made six recommendations to government agencies and industry groups when it released the study in 2011. None has been implemented. Jeff Eshelman, spokesman for the Independent Petroleum Association of America, said the number of fatal fires and explosions is small and getting smaller." Of the 4,405 workplace fatalities which occurred in the United States in 2013, 13 were associated with fire/explosions in E&P operations, thats down almost half from the prior year 2012 with 23 incidents," Eshelman said. "While this represents a very small percentage, it is certainly unacceptable, and industry safety is our No. 1 priority" Last years 13 fire and explosion deaths, though, were more than for any other private industry. Oil and gas had 112 fatalities overall in 2013, down from 142 in 2012.The only "industry" to have more fire and explosion fatalities than oil and gas in 2013 was firefighting, which had 42. That was a tenfold increase from 2012, driven by

several disasters such as the Yarnell Hill wildfires in Arizona that claimed the lives of 19 firefighters. Eshelman said measures have been adopted throughout the industry to prevent fires and explosions, such as better design standards, gas detectors, strict control of potential ignition sources, rigid smoking restrictions and new firefighting equipment. But the thick files generated by OSHA investigations at fatal well explosions detail dangerous habits at well sites. The carelessness not only injured or killed workers but risked the safety of those living nearby. Some examples: • Two rig supervisors continued to drill at an AB Resources well site near Moundsville, W.Va, in 2010, even after the air filled with flammable methane gas. It then exploded, injuring seven men and melting the rig. The methane came from an abandoned coal mine the Union Drilling Inc crew had already pierced once when drilling an adjacent well. They were using a process called "drilling on air" that

is particularly dangerous when the drill bit hits oil or gas. • After an explosion killed a company employee, the safety manager of Weatherford, Texas-based C&R Downhole Drilling told investigators she was new to the position and did not have any formal training in safety. Investigators believe the employee, Tommy Paxton, 45, and four other men were standing in a "flammable vapor cloud" at the Antero Resources site near West Union, W.Va, in 2013 when a spark triggered the explosion. Jason Means, 37, an employee of Nabors Completion and Production Services, was also killed and three others were injured. US EPA in 1998 exempted oil and gas sites from Clean Air Act risk management regulations based on the belief that oil and gas coming out of the ground is "unlikely to form large vapor clouds." • The rented blowout preventer used by Premium Well Drilling at a well near Carrizo Springs, Texas, in 2008 wasnt fully tested after it was installed, and the crew wasnt

trained to use it. The blowout preventer also lacked a shear ram, which would have allowed it to close off the well bore when the crew hit a gas pocket and the well "kicked." The rig went up in flames and Jesus Beltran, 67, was killed Two other workers suffered burns in the fire at the well, owned by Express Oil Co. • Contract workers killed in a 2011 explosion in Wyoming had no formal training or supervision before being sent to install a fuel line. One worker was welding on a gas line connected to a storage tank containing more than 1,300 gallons of crude oil at a Samson Resources Co. well site outside Casper The explosion killed James Turner, 55, of Double D Welding and Fabrication, and Gerardo Alatorre and Llewellyn "Louie" Dort, 32, both of Wild West Construction. The blast also hurled two 4,000-gallon metal tanks more than 120 feet and caused a 10-acre fire. • A battery-powered headlamp worn by a water truck driver appears to have been enough to set off

the flammable hydrocarbons venting out of a "brine" wastewater tank at an EQT Production Co. well in February 2013 in Flemington, W.Va The driver, 43-year-old Brian Hopkins, was working for Central Environmental Services Inc. (CES) He was blown off the catwalk and killed The explosion tossed a two-story brine tank 100 feet. EQTs tests found no problems with the equipment, but OSHA cited CES for giving employees headlamps that were not "intrinsically safe" around flammable vapors. 18 Source: http://www.doksinet The drilling industrys safety record has become increasingly important as the nations drilling boom pushes into densely populated areas that have less familiarity with drilling. An explosion at an oil well near Bolivar, Ohio, in 2012 killed a worker, hurled a tank more than 250 feet and alarmed neighbors. Photo by Brandie Hanley The Wall Street Journal last year reported that at least 15.3 million Americans lived within a mile of a well that had been

drilled since 2000. That is more people than live in Michigan or New York City The new wells are not always welcomed by their neighbors. Drilling in the suburbs of Denver has prompted some cities to try to ban hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, an essential practice for producing from shale. Even some cities in oil-friendly Texas are weighing bans or sharp restrictions on drilling. A research paper from the Colorado School of Public Health earlier this year observed that accidents at well sites dont simply jeopardize workers but can also expose those who live nearby to fires, explosions and hazardous chemicals. "Its absolutely a concern," said John Adgate, chairman of the schools Department of Environmental and Occupational Health and co-author of the research review, which was funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the Department of Energy. "When you go out and talk to groups, thats what people want to know about," he said, "those kind of

potential catastrophic risks." Painkillers for a paper cut Oil and gas producers are currently fighting to keep their exemption from a set of rules intended to prevent industrial explosions. OSHA developed the "process safety management program" in the 1990s after a series of disasters at refineries and chemical plants. "PSM," as its called, helped lower fatalities and generated more information to help prevent accidents. But OSHA officials agreed to leave out oil and gas Instead, the agency said there should be a separate set of rules to fit the industrys "uniqueness." Shortly after that, presidential administrations changed and the initiative stalled (EnergyWire, Feb. 25) The April 2013 fertilizer plant explosion in West, Texas, which killed three residents and 12 first responders, prompted the Obama administration to take another look at the PSM rule. Among other ideas, the administration signaled interest in ending the exemption for drilling

companies. Oil and gas companies are fighting the idea, saying the program is a poor fit for the fast-moving drilling business. 19 Source: http://www.doksinet Tests on sludge in the tank of the West Penn truck showed it contained "aliphatic hydrocarbons" -- chemical cousins of oil and gas that are prone to explode. Photo courtesy of OSHA "Like prescribing painkillers for a paper cut" is how Rick Muncrief described it. Muncrief, senior vice president of operations and resource development for Continental Resources Inc., added in his letter to OSHA that it would likely cause a regulatory "overdose." The oil and gas industry brings a lot of horsepower to any such regulatory debate. It spent $145 million lobbying the federal government last year, according to OpenSecretsorg, more than any other industry except pharmaceuticals and insurance. But the CSB -- the independent agency charged with investigating industrial accidents -- says applying PSM to

drilling is the proper remedy for a real problem. "High rates of worker injuries and fatalities within this sector suggest that PSM requirements are urgently needed," the agency said in comments sent under the signature of Chairman Rafael MoureEraso. Chevrons fire and free pizza So far this year, there have been at least eight fatal oil and gas explosions in the United States. The best-known of them -- a blast at a Chevron well in southwest Pennsylvania -- played into the debate on approving drilling at the Pittsburgh airport. Chevron earned national derision after the February fire for distributing coupons for free pizza to locals. Many residents, though, said they appreciated the gesture State officials found chaotic management of the site. Chevron had used "no fewer than seven" site managers at the site in the week before the fire, some of whom had "virtually no oil field experience" (EnergyWire, Aug. 8) The Feb. 11 accident was at least the second

fatal oil and gas industry explosion of the year Daniel Rice, 33, was killed in January in Knoxville, Ark., when a truck tank of drilling wastewater exploded Workers had been thawing valves on the tank with a propane torch. Common practice Its not an unusual way to melt the ice on the back of a truck. Thats what OSHA inspectors found when they looked into the accident that killed Greg Bish. "I have thawed many of the valves using the torch," David Champion, a co-worker of Bish with 34 years of experience, told an inspector. "We also thaw the frac tanks" Several others said the same thing. In the months before the accident, a Pennsylvania safety consultant had told OSHA it was "common practice." Michael Rubeo of Lancaster Safety Consulting wrote in January 2010 on behalf of a company that used propane torches to thaw frozen lines at production sites. OSHAs response, noting there are no specific federal rules to prevent thawing valves with a propane torch,

is part of the agencys investigative file. 20 Source: http://www.doksinet Since 2009, oil and gas production has had more deaths from fires and explosion than any private industry. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries. "That was relative to what we were seeing in our region at that time," Rubeo, whose office is in Wexford, Pa., outside Pittsburgh, said in a recent interview. "You drive two hours north of here and get into the more remote areas, and Im sure any number of practices like that are still performed." Bish worked for West Penn Energy Services, a 20-year-old company headquartered just outside the small borough of Elderton, Pa., in the thick of the Marcellus Shale boom West Penn was no rogue operator The companys safety manager was on the safety committee of the Pennsylvania Independent Oil and Gas Association. The company had a state-certified safety and health program, which allowed it to get discounts on workers

compensation insurance. West Penns website states, "We are committed to doing things right" Investigators found that while West Penn had a "strong safety program" in terms of written materials, many workers said they werent trained in the practices listed. West Penn President Michael Zentz did not return phone and email messages. In a statement at the time, the company said, "Our companys foremost priority is ensuring the health and safety of our employees." The West Penn yard, at the intersection of two highways about an hours drive northwest of Pittsburgh, backed up to a school. Elderton High School (which has since closed) is about 520 feet up a hill from the truck yard Theres a house about 700 feet away. Bish was from Ford City, about 25 minutes away. His mother, Kim Bish, said he took the job to be closer to home after a couple of years traveling with fracking crews. That meant more time to hunt and fish and spend time with his girlfriend, she said in

an interview. He also told her his new job was safer After all, he was driving a "water truck." But the "water" is waste fluid from oil and gas sites. OSHA took samples of the sludge in the bottom of the tank and found a range of "aliphatic hydrocarbons" -- chemical cousins of oil and gas that are prone to explode."He told me, Ive got a safe job now, Mom," she said. "That haunts me every day" 21